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Title:  ? Port State Control: Assessment and Analysis 
Degree:                          MSc 
Abstract 
This dissertation is a study of the d effectiveness of port State control from a global 
perspective and the challenges faced in the current regime, based on the information 
from IMO and several leading PSC MoUs as well as literatures from distinguished 
scholars. 
A brief retrospect is taken at the background of the emergence and development of 
the international PSC regime. The definition of PSC and the main reasons, which 
triggered the development of the PSC regime all over the world, are examined. The 
legal basis for the port States to conduct PSC inspections is reviewed. The provisions 
included in various international conventions, such as UNCLOS, SOLAS, MARPOL, 
STCW and so on, are examined so that people may have a clear idea of the 
legitimacy of the international PSC regime. 
The rationale of regional PSC MoUs is investigated. The development of the nine 
existing regional PSC MoUs and USCG in recent years is examined. The procedures 
on conducting PSC inspection and guidelines developed by IMO recently are also 
investigated. 
The effectiveness of PSC is assessed mainly based on the inspection results from the 
Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and USCG during the last decades. The cost efficient of 
PSC regime is also under scrutiny. 
However, the PSC regime is not perfect in eliminating the substandard ships. It has 
V  
its own inherent limitations. In addition, with the popularization of PSC regime, 
some challenges emerge during the development. The imbalanced development of 
PSC regime in the worldwide still gives living space to the substandard ships. The 
effectiveness of the PSC regime is diluted by the unqualified Port State Control 
Officers. Undue detention also reduces the fairness of the regime.  
The concluding chapter provides a conclusion that the PSC is a supplement to the 
flag State control. It is an effective regime in eliminating substandard ships. But it is 
not yet effective enough to eliminate all of the substandard ships running around the 
world. The responsibility of flag States, shipowners and other stakeholders should 
never be neglected. Some recommendations and proposals may be useful in replying 
the challenges faced by the PSC regime.  
Key words: Port State control, Effectiveness, MoU, Challenges, PSCO, Safety, 
International Conventions. 
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Chapter I 
 Introduction 
In the past 80 years, the shipping industry expanded greatly in scale. The world’s fleet 
expanded from 61.5 million gross tonnage in 1924 to 584.9 million gross tonnage in 
2002 (Francisco, 2003). With the booming of maritime activities, a series of maritime 
accidents happened and caused a great loss and damage to human life, marine 
environment and properties. In response, the international maritime community has 
adopted international laws concerning safety, security at sea and marine environment 
protection. These international laws include conventions such as United Nations 
Convention on The Law of The Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS 1982), Safety of Life at Sea 
Convention 1974, as amended by the 1978 Protocol (SOLAS 1974/1978), 
International Convention for the prevention of pollution from ships 1973, as amended 
by the 1978 Protocol (MARPOL73/78), International Convention on Load Lines 1966 
(LL 66), International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended in 1995(1978 STCW as amended in 
1995), the International Labour Organization Convention No.147(ILO 147), etc; 
hundreds of codes such as International Management Code for the Safe Operation of 
Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM), International Code for the Security of Ships 
and of Port Facilities (ISPS), International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG 
Code), etc and numerous resolutions and recommendations. They are developed by 
United Nation (UN), International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International 
Labor Organization (ILO) respectively. A list of status of IMO conventions is given in 
Table 1 Appendix A. The purposes of these instruments are to improve the safety of 
ships, protect the marine environment from ship-source pollution and raise the 
standards of crewing, training and accommodation on board ships. As Parties to the 
abovementioned international conventions the flag States have obligations to give full 
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and complete effects to these conventions. In other words, it is the responsibility of 
the flag States to make sure that ships flying their flags are constructed, equipped, 
maintained, manned and operated to comply with the standards laid down by the 
relevant international organization. 
Nevertheless, some flag States have neither political will nor financial muscle and 
maritime know-how to properly discharge their regulatory obligations (Shiming, 
2001). At the same time, shipowners and the classes fail their obligations in observing 
the safe operation of ships because of the fierce competition in the maritime market. 
This made many substandard ships easily fly the flag of these States and sail around 
the world in unsafe condition. In consequence, these substandard ships became 
threatening elements to the safety of human lives and maritime environment. A series 
of maritime accidents which induced heavy loss of human lives and maritime 
environment tragedy in the history have been proven to be the result of such defective 
flag State control regime. International maritime community feel it is insufficient to 
totally rely on the flag States to ensure “safe, secure, efficient shipping on clean 
oceans”. Another tier of control - Port State Control (PSC) regime need to be set up to 
eliminate the substandard ships which slipped from the flag State control regime. 
Port State Control is the regime under which ships are inspected in ports of the 
countries they visit to ensure they comply with internationally accepted standards and 
are manned and operated in compliance with the applicable international laws (O’Neil, 
2003). It is not a new concept. The port State control regulation existed in as early as 
1929 SOLAS. Other major conventions such as MARPOL 73/78, 1978 STCW as 
amended in 1995, ILO 147, etc have similar control provisions. Therefore, the powers 
used by Port State Control Officers (PSCOs) are not new, it is the willingness to use 
this power which is new (Özçayır, 2003). 
However, we must bear in mind port State control is an important complement to the 
work of the flag State but never be a replacement for it. Under international law, it is 
the flag State that is primarily responsible for ensuring that ship on its register comply 
with the applicable regulations and standards (O’Neil, 2003). In an ideal world where 
flag States give full and complete effect to the adopted international conventions, port 
State control would not be necessary.  
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During the past twenty years, port State control developed very fast. The first regional 
agreement on port State control - The Paris Memorandum of Understanding (Paris 
MoU) was signed in 1982. Now, there are nine regional MoUs which cover all over 
the world. Port State control is playing an indispensable role in eliminating the 
substandard ships. At one time, some questions such as the effectiveness of the PSC 
regime, cost-efficiency of the PSC regime have always been debated in the 
international maritime community. Also, in the future PSC regime face new 
challenges such as imbalanced development of the PSC regime, lack of trained 
PSCOs and undue detentions. This dissertation will review the development of PSC 
regime, discuss the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of the PSC regime and analyze 
the challenges ahead. Finally, it will draw a conclusion and give recommendations or 
solutions to the challenges. The research is primary based on the literatures of 
distinguished scholars and documents from IMO and MoUs. The main difficulty 
encountered in this research is the lack of information from PSC inspections in some 
MoUs. Therefore, the analysis in this dissertation may not reflect the whole picture of 
the world PSC regime. 
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Chapter II  
The Background of Port State Control 
2.1 Introduction 
The emergence of PSC has many reasons. On one hand, some flag States fail their 
obligations in ensuring the ships flying their flags to comply with the standards 
stipulated in the international conventions. On the other hand, port State jurisdiction 
as a relatively new concept has gained wide reorganization in international 
community (Özçayır, 2003). At one time, the growth of flag of convenience and a 
series of oil pollution accidents in 1960s and 1970s made people realize port State 
control as a back-up control system need to be established to ensure the compliance of 
ships.  
2.2 Flag State jurisdiction and flag State control  
The words “freedom of the seas” have been described as a fundamental element of 
international law from the initiation of legal relationships between nations (Hawkins, 
2005). The high seas are open to all States; whether coastal or land-locked. However, 
ship has to posses a nationality through registration to be able to prove its existence 
when it sails on the high seas. The reason behind this requirement is to ensure that 
each vessel will be subject to some regulatory scheme and system of laws. Otherwise, 
ships exist in the “legal vacuum”. Registration is the administration act by which 
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nationality and collateral rights and duties are conferred on a ship. With registration in 
a State, a ship comes within the national jurisdiction of that State (Özçayır, 2003). 
The term, jurisdiction describes the power of a State under international law to 
exercise its authority over persons and property by the use of its municipal law. It is 
one of the most important concepts of international maritime law (Özçayır, 2003). 
Therefore, State assumes authority over the ship to exercise the power inherent in the 
jurisdiction of the flag State. The State undertakes the national and international 
responsibilities of a flag State in relation to that ship.  
The national flag constitutes the primary source of State responsibility in relation to a 
ship. On the high seas, only the flag State may exercise rights over the ship in relation 
to jurisdiction. In other words, the State which has granted the ship the right to sail 
under its flag has the exclusive right to exercise legislation and enforcement 
jurisdiction over it on the high seas. The vessels on the high seas are subject to no 
authority except that the State whose flag they fly. 
When flag States has jurisdiction over the ships which are entitled to fly their flags, 
they also have duties to ensure their ships comply with the standards accepted by the 
flag States under international law and conventions. According to Article 94 of 
UNCLOS 1982, every State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in 
administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag (UNCLOS, 
1982). The flag State is required to take such measures for ships flying its flag as are 
necessary to ensure safety at sea with regard to construction, maintenance and 
seaworthiness, manning, labour condition and crew training, prevention collision. 
This article establishes the link between municipal and international law (Özçayır, 
2003). It imposes a duty on flag States to take any steps which may be necessary to 
secure observance with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and 
practices.  
2.3 Coastal State jurisdiction and port State jurisdiction  
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Coastal State is the State within whose maritime zone a foreign ship is for the time 
being. According to international law, any State having a coastline is entitled to take 
certain limited steps to protect its own interests (Hare, 1994).  
The international law provides that the maritime zone under the jurisdiction of coastal 
State can be divided into 4 parts: internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone and 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The jurisdiction power of coastal State is 
diminishing from internal water to the high seas. Subjected to few exceptions, the 
coastal State may exercise full jurisdiction over foreign merchant ships within its 
internal waters (Özçayır, 2003). In territorial sea, the coastal State can also exert 
jurisdiction over foreign ships. But the foreign ships enjoy innocent passage over the 
territorial sea.  
Port State jurisdiction over the enforcement of applicable international rules and 
standards for the protection and preservation of the marine environment is relatively 
new concept (Özçayır, 2003). Historically, the port authorities did not enforce local 
jurisdiction over foreign ships which are voluntarily and temporarily present in their 
ports. Port State jurisdiction was first introduced for detailed international 
consideration at the 1973 IMO conference on marine pollution. During the conference, 
a proposal was made for port State enforcement. Although this proposal was not 
adopted, it was considered as the most innovative and far-reaching one on port State 
enforcement. Article 6(2) of MARPOL provides that port officials in the contracting 
parties may inspect a foreign vessel in order to verify whether it has discharged in any 
sea area harmful substance in violations of the regulations annexed to the convention. 
Article 6(5) also provides a right of inspection applies to cases where port officials 
receive from any other Parties to the convention, a request for an investigation 
together with “sufficient evidence that the ship has discharged harmful substance or 
effluent containing such substances in any place” (MARPOL, 2002). 
2.4 Impetus for the emergence of PSC  
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In an ideal world, PSC would not exist if flag States fully and completely enforce 
their obligation on implementation of the international conventions. However, some 
flag States did not discharge their obligations to ensure the ships flying their flag to 
conform the requirements and standards laid down in the international conventions. 
Besides this fundamental reason, other factors such as the booming of flag of 
convenience, successional serious oil pollution accidents in 60s and 70s, and the 
failure of assuming their responsibilities by classification societies also contributed to 
the emergence of PSC. 
2.4.1 The failure of flag State implementation 
The international law and conventions provide that flag States have a duty to ensure 
that their ships comply with the standards accepted by the flag State. However, many 
flag States have failed to implement international standards either because some 
States do not have maritime administrations with systems in place to enforce the 
relevant conventions they have signed, or because other States simply lack the will to 
enforce the obligations they have signed up to (Williamson, 1996).  
2.4.2 The booming of flag of convenience  
Although the term of “flag of convenience” has been profusely used since 1950, the 
use of Flags of Convenience (FOCs) dates back several centuries. In the 16th century, 
British ships improperly used the Spanish flag in order to overcome the existing 
restrictions about trade in the West Indies. Today, about 54% of world’s tonnage fly 
the flag of convenience (Francisco, 2003). The shipowners registered their ships under 
a foreign flag so as to overcome obstacles or restrictions of a political or economic 
nature which affected their own country. There are various reasons for the booming of 
FOC.  
Fundamentally, there was no uniform interpretation on the meaning of “genuine link” 
in the international maritime communities. Article 91 of UNCLOS provides that a 
genuine link must exist between the flag State and the ship when the State grants 
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nationality to the ship. However, different States have different opinions on what is 
the genuine link. Some States set very strict conditions on ship registry while FOC set 
little restrictions on granting nationalities. Therefore, shipowners prefer to registering 
their ships in FOC to round the restrictions set by their country. Furthermore, FOCs 
set up advantages yielded by lower crew costs, freedom to use foreign labour, together 
with low taxes to increase their share in the world fleet.  
Today it is unfair to relate all FOCs to substandard or lost ships because some FOCs 
have excellent safety records according to the fleet statistics and analyzing report on 
detention in Europe, the USA and Asia in recent years (Francisco, 2003). But, for 
many years, vessels registered under FOCs were involved in maritime disasters, such 
as Amoco Cadiz, Torrey Canyon and the most recent Erika. Also, the casualty records 
show that the casualty rate for FOC is substantially higher than that of the regulated 
fleet. Let’s take the performance of Panama in 1997 for example, it lost more ships 
and more tonnage than any other flag State in the world. And it had the highest 
number of detentions, with 449 ships detained in this year (Özçayır, 2003). In this 
case, the role of port State should be hardened as it has proved to be the most efficient 
way of verifying compliance by registers, either open or closed (Francisco, 2003). 
2.4.3 Successional serious oil pollution accidents in 60s and 70s 
In the 1960s and 1970s, several serious oil pollution accidents happened. These 
accidents cause great maritime environment disaster and economic loss. Especially, 
Torry Canyon grounded along the Scilly Islands, UK in 1967 and lost almost 120,000 
tonnes of oil. This accident highlights the issue concerning the extent to which a State 
directly threatened or affected by a casualty which takes place outside its territorial 
sea can or should be allowed to take measures to protect its coastline. In other words, 
the rights of a coastal State to intervene in case of oil pollution threat because any 
discharge in contravention of the convention or any alleged violation detected by a 
member State may be reported to the flag State for investigation and legal action as 
appropriate. Following deliberation in IMO’s legal committee, a diplomatic 
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conference met in 1969 to adopt two new instruments. The first one dealt with the 
right to intervene, the international convention relating to intervention on the high sea 
in case of oil pollution casualties (Intervention Convention). The second was Civil 
Liability Convention (CLC). Under the intervention convention, the coastal State was 
first time to be given the right to take preventive and mitigating actions against 
vessels posing an environmental threat to its coast. Finally, in 1973 a significant 
breakthrough came when the international Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships, usually referred to as MARPOL, was adopted by IMO, which enshrined 
the concept of Port State Control in international law. Following this convention, the 
port States were provided the right to inspect ships and report their deficiencies to the 
flag State and to detain ships until deficiencies were rectified 
2.4.4 The failure of assuming their responsibilities by classification societies 
The establishment of classification societies goes back to the 17th and early 18th 
centuries. They came into existence during this period out of the needs of marine 
insurers and shipowners. Today, the classification societies own duties to ensure that 
the specified ship has been designed, built and is maintained according to the 
classification society’s own rules. In addition, they are authorized by the flag States to 
conduct statutory surveys and issue certificates in accordance with the various 
international maritime conventions.  
In most time, most classification societies especially the International Association of 
Classification Societies (IACS) members do their job well in ensuring the safety and 
quality of shipping. However, some classification societies fail to fulfill their duties 
because of the fierce competition in the market. Also, world famous classification 
societies did not do their job good enough in sometimes. For example the in the Erika 
case, the ship’s class is granted by Registro Italiano Navale (RINA), who is a member 
of IACS. In another case Prestige, the ship’s class is ABS. Lloyds Register and DNV, 
BV and the Polish Register have sometimes faced (and hotly disputed) allegations that 
their surveyors sell forged safety certificates (Hare, 1994). Therefore, another tier of 
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control regime need to be in place to monitor the performance of classification 
societies.  
2.5 The legal background of port State control 
International maritime law codified the concept of port State control. The first one is 
the Article 6(2) of MARPOL. Following MARPOL, other conventions also provides 
control provisions which constitute the legal background of port State control. 
2.5.1 UNCLOS 1982 
UNCLOS 1982 is the constitution of the law of the sea. Almost all regulatory 
maritime conventions can find their root in the UNCLOS 1982. The concept of PSC 
can be found in part ? and ?. Article 25 of the UNCLOS (1982) empowered States 
whose ports were used by vessels to take necessary steps to prevent any breach of the 
conditions by vessels calling at their ports. Article 216 and 218 enable a port State to 
enforce international antidumping and anti-pollution measures. In addition, States are 
required by Article 219 to take administrative measures to prevent errant vessels from 
sailing. Legitimacy for PSC inspections may be found in these Articles of UNCLOS. 
The only limitation is that the steps taken should be reasonable, public, and not 
discriminatory (Hare, 1994). These articles provide legal background of PSC in 
UNCLOS 1982. 
2.5.2 Control provisions in IMO conventions  
The provisions for the control of foreign ships in ports originate from the inclusion of 
a respective regulation in the SOLAS convention. the history of the control provisions, 
aiming at verifying whether certificates carried on board ships in accordance with the 
specific requirements of Chapter I of the SOLAS Convention, are valid or not, goes 
back to 1914. Article 61 of 1914 SOLAS is the first control provision which required 
the contracting government to verify the certificates carried on board. The following 
SOLAS Convention also provided the control provision. Under Article 54 of the 1929 
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SOLAS Convention intervention actions were permitted to officers carrying out the 
control. In Reg. 18 Chapter 1 of the 1948 SOLAS Port State control officers were 
authorized for the first time, not to allow the unworthy ship to proceed to sea. Similar 
provisions can be found in Reg. 19, Chapter 1 of the 1960 and 1974 SOLAS.  
Other IMO conventions also contain control provisions which can be followed by a 
Party to the relevant conventions to carry out inspection. These provisions are: 
- Load Line 66, Article 21; 
- MARPOL 73/78, Article 5 and 6, Reg. 8A of Annex ?, Reg. 15 of Annex ?, 
Reg. 8 of Annex ?, Reg. 8 of Annex ? and Reg. 10 of Annex ? 
- STCW 78, Article ? and Reg. ?/4 
- Tonnage 69, Article 12  
2.5.3 ILO conventions  
ILO Convention No. 147 Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention 1976 
aims to establish basic minimum standards with regard to safety, working and labour 
conditions for seafarers. It requires administrations to have effective legislation on 
safe manning standards, hours of work, seafarers’ competency, social security and 
sets of employment standards equivalent to those contained in a range of ILO 
instruments. The control provision is contained in Article 4, which allows an 
administration to apply its provisions (including the power of detention) to any ship, 
which calls at its ports, whether or not the ship’s flag State has ratified the 
Convention.  
2.6 Conclusion  
Port State control is a back-up control system because the primary responsibility to 
safeguard against substandard ships lies with the flag States. Although many 
international conventions provide power used by PSCOs, the willingness to use these 
power is relative new. That is because regional cooperation between member States is 
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necessary for effective PSC. Starting from Paris MoU, port State control became more 
organized and widespread and now there is a MoU on PSC covering almost every part 
of the world. 
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Chapter III 
The Regional PSC MoUs and PSC Procedures  
3.1 Introduction  
Memorandum of understanding on PSC is the regional agreement on PSC. The 
purpose of MoUs is to achieve harmonization, the elimination of redundancy and 
exchange of PSC information. In the present time, there are nine MoUs which cover 
almost every part of the world. Paris MoU is the first MoU and regarded as model 
upon which other regions of the world base their agreement on PSC. The Unite State 
Coast Guard (USCG) is not a member of any MoU, but it can be regarded as a 
regional MoU by itself. 
3.2 Rationale for growth in PSC regional agreements  
The establishment of regional initiatives in which States are tied together in their port 
State control activities by MoUs. With the ease of dissemination of information 
through the internet, it is also likely to become the norm that the various regional 
initiatives, set up for geographic convenience, will increasingly share each other’s 
database, thereby closing the net even more effectively on the unseaworthy ship and 
its unscrupulous owner seeking to ply a trade into unsuspecting ports. 
Crucial to the success of port State control operations is the sharing of information 
gained about particular ships or their owners and operators, between jurisdictions in 
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and out of which those ships trade. There are two reasons for this. First, one would not 
like unduly to inconvenience ships by inspecting them at each port. It is reasonable to 
believe that Contracting States to conventions providing for PSC inspections will 
follow through on those obligations, an uncoordinated effort within a region can result 
in duplication of effort, redundancy, inefficiency and the few substandard ships that 
should be detained being able to avoid detention.  
Second, co-operation with other ports in the region make it possible to ensure that 
identified substandard ships are effectively monitored. This applies especially to ships 
that have been allowed to sail with certain minor deficiencies on condition that they 
are rectified in the next port of call. When permission has been granted for a 
substandard ship to sail from one port, contingent in the deficiencies being rectified in 
the next port, it is essential for this information to be passed on to the authorities in 
the next port to ensure that those deficiencies have, in fact, been rectified. If 
subsequent PSC inspectors have no prior knowledge of earlier inspections, they can 
not follow up in the correction of deficiencies or target habitual offenders. 
3.3 Introduction of the existing nine MoUs and USCG 
3.3.1 The existing nine MoUs 
In the present, there are nine MoUs which totally have 130 member Maritime 
Authorities. The nine MoUs are: Paris MoU, AcuerdoViña del Mar MoU 
(Latin-America Agreement), Tokyo MoU, Caribbean MoU, Mediterranean MoU, 
Indian Ocean MoU, West & Central Africa MoU (ABUJA MoU), Black Sea MoU, 
The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (Riyadh MoU). All of the 
nine MoUs have a Port State Control committee, the Secretariat and information 
center. Port State control committee is the executive body, composed of 
representatives from each maritime Authority of the MoU. The secretariat acts under 
the guidance of the Port State Control Committee, prepares meetings and assists the 
committee in carrying out its function. The secretariat also exchange information and 
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prepare reports. The information centers established database to store all details from 
each inspection report whether deficiencies are found or not. Most of the MoUs 
launched the computerized information system for the purpose of exchanging 
information on port State inspections. This information exchange makes information 
available to Authorities on inspection of ships in other regional ports to assist them in 
their selection if foreign flag ships to be inspected and their exercise of port State 
control on selected ships. The detailed information of the MoUs can be found in the 
Appendix B Table 2 
3.3.2 USCG 
The USCG began inspecting foreign-flagged tank and passenger vessels nearly 40 
years ago. However, the Coast Guard did not closely scrutinize foreign-flagged freight 
ships until in 1994, when directed by Congress to develop a formal Port State Control 
programme (USCG, 2005). The principle objective of this program is to identify high 
risk foreign merchant ships on the basis of the performance records of their owners, 
operators, classification societies and flag State and to systematically target ships for 
boarding.  
In the USA, there is no agreement or memorandum of understanding which is 
specifically dedicated to port State control. The US exercise its port State control 
authority through the US Coast Guard’s long foreign vessel boarding program, now 
referred to as the Port State Control Program.  
The USCG introduces the point rating system to assess the safety level of the vessels. 
According to the point rating system, ships are categorized as Priority I, II or III. 
Priority I includes the high-risk vessels, which require inspection before they are even 
allowed into port limits, often at the buoys. Defects must be rectified before the vessel 
enters the port if it is possible. Other ships will be inspected following the priority 
rating assigned to them. Flags, owners & operators and classification societies are 
assessed to help assigning the priority rating to a vessel under inspection. If any of 
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these entities fails to fully undertake its responsibilities for the safe operation of a ship, 
then the ship is likely to be considered a sub-standard vessel by the USCG. A 
percentage rating is then given to both flags and classification societies. 
The USCG also publicize the lists of owners and operators, flag States and 
classification societies, which have fallen foul of USCG PSC procedures during the 
past twelve months. The USCG diligently publishes monthly detention records, giving 
full details of the vessel and the defects both on its website and in Lloyds List. 
3.4 The development of the nine MoUs and USCG in the recent years 
3.4.1 Paris MoU 
In 2004, for the first time since the inception of the Paris MoU the Committee 
embarked on a fundamental review of the inspection regime. The port State control 
region aims to enhance its fight against sub-standard shipping by adopting a more risk 
based approach while at the same time reducing the burden on good operators. 
Changes under consideration include a move towards full coverage of ships entering 
the region rather than the current commitment of each member to inspect 25%. 
Periods between inspections would depend on the risk profile of an individual vessel. 
The review will also consider extending the current provisions for banning tankers, 
bulk carriers and passenger ships to other ships which independent research has 
shown to present a disproportionate risk, particularly to their crews. The Committee 
will be working closely with the European Commission to take account of the 3rd 
Maritime Safety Package in developing a new regime for the 21st century.  
Continuing its annual programme of inspection campaigns the campaigns on GMDSS, 
operational requirements and MARPOL Annex 1 for 2005 and 2006, respectively. 
The Paris MoU organized the first Expert Training programme and the first 
Specialized Training programme. The theme of the expert training programme are 
safety and security, while the theme of the Specialized Training programme is the 
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inspection of bulk cargos (Paris MoU, 2005) 
The Review Panel became a permanent feature of Paris MoU procedures in 2003. 
Flag States or classification societies that cannot resolve a dispute concerning a 
detention with the port State, may submit their case for review. The Review Panel is 
composed of representatives of 3 different MoU Authorities, on a rotating basis, plus 
the Secretariat. 
In November 2004, the Second Joint Ministerial Conference of the Paris and Tokyo 
Memoranda of Understanding on Port State Control was held in Canada. The 
Conference demonstrated the joint commitment of the two regions to eliminate 
substandard ships so as to promote maritime safety, working and living conditions on 
board and protection of the marine environment and to work more closely for 
harmonizing port State control procedures and enhancing port State control activities 
and initiatives. 
3.4.2 Acuerdo Viña del Mar Agreement (Latin-America Agreement) 
The Committee approved interim PSC procedures relating to cargo operations in 2003. 
A number of working groups and correspondence groups were established which 
covered a wide variety of issues such as drawing up electronic data requirements to 
facilitate the performance of and reporting on PSC activities related to maritime and 
port security; drawing up proposals on harmonized PSC activities related to maritime 
security; examining the viability of adopting regional standards and PSC measures 
related to all vessels with a gross tonnage of less than 500 and examining deficiency 
codes related to the implementation of the STCW Convention. Other matters such as 
the activities of the Information Center, the participation of the Agreement at 
international meetings and events, the training of inspectors, the verification 
procedures and improvements in the management of inspections and related 
information, the legal status of the Agreement’s relevant instruments and the activities 
of other regional bodies and international organizations were discussed by the 
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Committee (IMO, 2004). 
3.4.3 Tokyo MoU 
The Committee adopted the revised Port State Control Manual on its 15th session. 
The ship targeting system developed by Republic of Korea was launched on 1st 
March, 2004. In order to be consistent with Paris MoU, the Concentrated Inspection 
Campaigns (CICs) on the safety of bulk carrier, ISPS Code, operational requirements 
and MARPOL Annex I were held in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 respectively.  
For the purpose of providing a mechanism for dealing with complaints by flag State 
or recognized organization (RO) against detention order by the port State Authority 
on a regional basis, Tokyo MoU launched a Detention Review Panel which 
considered the complaint received from procedural and technical aspects and, if 
appropriate, make advisory recommendation to the port State Authority to re-consider 
its decision. 
Besides, the Committee also considered on-going implementation and arrangements 
of data exchange with other PSC data base systems, i.e. Systeme d’Information 
Relatif aux Navires Controlles (SIReNaC) of Paris MoU, Black Sea MoU information 
system (BSIS), Information Centre of the Latin American Agreement (CIALA) and 
Port State Information eXchange (PSIX) of the USCG.  
Tokyo MoU organized the fourteenth basic training course, eleventh seminar for port 
State control officers and fellowship training course in 2004. For co-operating 
implementation and enforcement of the ISPS Code, the seminar was dedicated to the 
subject on maritime security. Under the current arrangement for PSC officers 
exchange programme, the Authorities of Australia, Canada, Hong Kong (China), 
Japan and New Zealand were provided the opportunity to send and receive one PSC 
officer with each other for exchange (Tokyo MoU, 2005). 
3.4.4 Caribbean MoU 
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In 2003, The Port State Control Committee adopted a work programme for the next 
biennium, which includes the development of a training strategy for PSCOs, including 
regular seminars, and the development of a Manual for Surveyors. Amendments to the 
text of the MoU and to the Caribbean Cargo Ship Safety Code (CCSSC) were 
discussed and agreed. The inclusion of the Code as a relevant instrument of the MoU 
was agreed in principle. The Committee also discussed the adoption of a Maritime 
Security Code for Cargo Vessels with a gross tonnage of between 100 and 500, 
operating in the Caribbean region, which had been prepared in draft form by the IMO 
Regional Maritime Adviser for the Caribbean.  
The Committee also agreed to the relocation of the Information Center from Curaçao 
to Suriname, following its agreement to accept an offer from Transport Canada to 
implement and host the Caribbean Information System within the existing Canadian 
port State control system (IMO, 2004). 
3.4.5 Mediterranean MoU 
In 2003, the Port State Control Committee held the 6th meeting of the Mediterranean 
MoU. The Committee reviewed progress made on the development of targeting 
factors and on the Mediterranean MoU Website. The Committee instructed the 
Secretariat to develop draft rules of procedure for administrative and financial matters 
for consideration by the Member States. The Committee established a Liaison 
Officers Group to deal with the information system. The Committee also set up a 
correspondence group to study the role of port State control in enhancing maritime 
security and in the implementation of the ISPS Code. For the training issues, Member 
States were urged to provide feedback to the European Commission on their 
experiences in the use of the PSC training package on CD ROM developed by the 
Commission. The Committee also supported proposals for approaching IMO with 
requests for the conduct of training courses for PSCOs and five yearly refresher 
courses for PSCOs (IMO, 2004). 
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3.4.6 Indian Ocean MoU 
In 2004, with a view to harmonize inspections in the region, the Indian Ocean MoU 
carried out a CIC on life saving-appliances. The Committee considered and approved 
amendments to the Memorandum and the Manual for Inspectors. The Committee also 
discussed PSC activities outside the Indian Ocean region, short and long-term training 
programmes, as well as training of PSCOs relating to the implementation of the ISPS 
Code. The development of the Indian Ocean MoU Computerized Information System 
(IOCIS) by the National Informatics Centre (NIC) of the Government of India was 
discussed and approved. 
3.4.7 Abuja MoU 
The 3rd meeting of the Abuja MoU Port State Control Committee held in 2003. Four 
working groups were established dealing with the Information Centre, the manual for 
PSCOs, training matters and administrative and financial issues. 
The Committee also adopted two recommendations, one on the ratification of the 
Abuja MoU and the relevant international conventions by the Member States and the 
other on the regular payment by Member States of their financial contributions for the 
functioning of the MoU. The Committee also issued a declaration stressing the Abuja 
MoU’s commitment to the enhancement of maritime safety and pollution prevention 
and to the harmonization of PSC procedures in the region. The appeal procedure also 
was established. 
3.4.8 Black Sea MoU 
In 2004, working Group on PSC Manual conveyed during the 5th Committee meeting 
and submitted proposal on improvement of the Black Sea MoU PSC Manual which 
was adopted by the committee. The committee accepted the initial “Rule of 
Procedures for Review Board” to implement on a trial basis. The Black Sea MoU 
carried out a CIC on ISPS code, simultaneously with Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and 
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USCG. The Black Sea MOU also sent 2 senior PSCOs to participate the Paris MoU 
seminar. The PSCO exchange programme also carried out among the member States 
(Black Sea MoU, 2005). 
To provide industry with the MoU news, procedures and inspection results, the Black 
Sea MoU launched the internet web-sit containing general information on MoU, 
regularly updated detention list and a direct link to the MoU database providing 
on-the-fly inspection results in 2003.  
3.4.9 The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (Riyadh MoU) 
The Memorandum of Understanding on PSC for the States of the Cooperation 
Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (Riyadh MoU), was signed in Riyadh on 30 
June 2004. To the present, there is little information on this MoU (IMO, 2004). 
3.4.10 USCG 
The USCG launched the Qualship 21 (Quality Shipping for the 21st Century) on 
January 1, 2001 (See Appendix C for detail), which is an initiative to identify high 
quality non-U.S. flagged vessels, and then reward them with incentives. The Qualship 
21 programme also evaluates each registry for eligibility on an annual basis. So far 
around 800 ships were were awarded Qualship 21 status in end of 2004. Eight States 
were awarded Qualifying Registries as of March, 2005 (USCG, 2005). 
The terrorist attacks on the U.S in September 2001 catalyzed significant security 
enhancements to governing the USCG’s safety-oriented Port State programme. With 
the adoption of the domestic legislation entitled “Maritime Transportation Security 
Act of 2002”( MTSA 2002), the ISPS Code and MTSA 2002 represent a significant 
expansion of focus for port State activities and are incorporated into their Port State 
Control programme to the fullest extent possible. The programme seamlessly 
incorporates and emphasizes compliance with security standards in addition to safety 
and environmental compliance standards (USCG, 2005). 
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3.5 The PSC procedures and IMO guidelines of PSC on specific aspects  
3.5.1 Introduction 
Although the main conventions provide the control provisions, the detail procedures 
on PSC are laid down in the IMO guidelines. In the 1981 Assembly, resolution 
A.466(?) on procedures for the control of ships was adopted and since then a variety 
of resolutions relating to port State control have became effective. The IMO 
Subcommittee on Flag State Implementation (FSI) reviewed and amalgamated 
existing resolutions and documents on port State control. As a result of this study, 
resolution A.787 (19) was adopted by the 19th Assembly of IMO. The resolution is 
intended to provide basic guidelines on the conduct of such inspections, the 
recognition of the deficiencies of a ship, its equipment, its crew and the application of 
control procedures. In 1999, the 21st Assembly adopted resolution A.882 (21) which 
amended the resolution A. 787 (19). This amendment gave the establishment of “clear 
ground” for more detail inspection, accidental damage, reports on remedial action and 
additions to the list of certificates and documents. It was also agreed to incorporate the 
Interim Guidelines for PSC related to the ISM Code. In addition, IMO adopted a list 
of circulars which provide guidelines for the inspection on specific aspects of ship 
operation, such as operation in compliance with ISPS Code, Annex ?  to 
MARPOL73/78. 
 3.5.2 General 
According to the guidelines provided by IMO, when the PSCO conducts an inspection 
of a ship, he may, before boarding, gain from its appearance in the water, an 
impression of its standard of maintenance from such items as the condition of its 
paint-work, corrosion, pitting or un-repaired damage. On boarding, and upon 
introduction to the master or the responsible ship’s officer, the PSCO should examine 
the vessel’s relevant certificates and documents. If the certificates are valid and the 
PSCO’s general impression and visual observations on board confirm a good standard 
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of maintenance, the PSCO should general confine the inspection to reported or 
observed deficiencies, if any. However, if the PSCO has clear grounds for carrying out 
a more detailed inspection, the master should be informed. As for the deficiencies 
found in the process of detailed inspection, the PSCO may take appropriate action to 
require the crews rectify deficiencies as soon as possible. If the deficiencies are 
serious enough to pose a danger in the forthcoming voyage, the PSCO may detain the 
ship. The final purpose is to prevent a ship from proceeding to sea in an unsafe 
condition or presenting unreasonable threat to marine environment. 
3.5.3 No more favourable treatment and non-convention size ships 
For the ship whose flag State is not a Party to a particular convention, the port State 
which is a Party to the convention may still enforce the requirements of the 
convention on this ship. Article ?(3) of the Protocol of 1987 to SOLAS 74; Article 5 
(4) of MARPOL 73/78 and Article ? (5) of STCW 78 stipulate that not more 
favourable treatment be given to ships of countries that are not Parties to these 
convention. In other words, ships registered in non-Party States should be held to the 
same international standards as ships registered in the port State, if the port State is a 
Contracting Party to one of the conventions. The resolution A.787 (19) also provides 
that: 
All Parties should as a matter of principle apply the procedures….[of 
no more favourable treatment]… to ships of no-Parties and ships 
below convention size in order to ensure that equivalent surveys and 
inspections are conducted and an equivalent level of safety and 
protection of the marine environment are ensured.  
The similar doctrine applies to ships below convention size. Generally speaking, a 
ship should not be permitted to sail if it is not safe or if it poses a threat to the marine 
environment. Although these ships may be exempted from international conventions, 
PSCO may take action, including detention if necessary to ensure that the ship does 
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not present a clear hazard to safety, health or the environment. The conditions of and 
on such ship and its equipment and the certification of the crew and the flag State’s 
minimum manning standard shall be compatible with the aims of the provisions of the 
conventions; otherwise, the ship shall be subject to such restriction as are necessary to 
obtain a comparable level of safety and protection of the marine environment. States 
in the Caribbean region have, with the assistance of IMO, developed specific regional 
regulations governing non-convention sized ships. These regulations gain wide 
recognition of USCG. 
3.5.4 The IMO and ILO guidelines of PSC on specific aspects 
Although the resolution A.787 (19) as amended by resolution A.882 (21) provides 
basic guidelines on conducting the PSC inspections, IMO and ILO also adopted a list 
of PSC inspection guidelines on maritime safety, security, environmental protection 
and labour conditions on board ships. The IMO guidelines includes: Guidance For 
Port State Control Officers On Issues Related to Certificates of Competency 
(MSC/Circ. 1030), Guideline Relating to The Implementation of SOLAS Chapter ?
-2 and ISPS Code (MSC/Circ. 1111), Guidelines For PSC Under MARPOL Annex 6 
(MEPC/Circ.472), etc. The ILO guideline includes Inspection of Labour Conditions 
on Board Ship: Guide-lines for Procedure. All of these guidelines are supplement to 
the basic guidelines of PSC contained in resolution A.787 (19) as amended by 
resolution A.882 (21). They provide technical assistance for PSCOs to conduct PSC 
inspections.  
3.6 Conclusion 
The existing nine MoUs and USCG almost cover every part of the world. Their 
development is not homogeneous. The Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and USCG are 
relatively matured. Whereas other MoUs are still in the developing stage. Great effort 
still needs to be taken by these MoUs and IMO to upgrade the PSC quality in these 
MoUs. The nine MoUs basically apply the same inspection procedures recommended 
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by IMO and ILO. However, the inspection procedure employed by USCG is slightly 
different form the guidelines of IMO. 
IMO developed not only basic procedures on conducting PSC inspections but also 
guidelines on how to inspect some specific aspects of ship. These guidelines help 
PSCOs carry out inspection in a more efficient and uniform way. They make the 
development of PSC keep up with the development of international conventions. The 
experience in the past 20 years showed that PSC had done a great effort in eliminating 
substandard ships. However, to which extent that the PSC regime has achieved its 
effectiveness? The next chapter will give a detained analysis on the effectiveness of 
PSC regime. 
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Chapter ? 
 The Effectiveness and Cost Efficiency of The PSC Regime 
4.1 Introduction  
With the popularity of the concept of port State control, more and more States use 
PSC as an effective tool to enforce the ships to implement IMO and ILO regulations 
and eliminate substandard ships. Although the primary responsibilities of 
implementing related international conventions lie on the flag States, the performance 
of PSC in recent years seems to overweight the performance of flag State in achieving 
their goal. This chapter will discuss the effectiveness of PSC regime by analyzing 
performance of the two main MoUs and USCG in recent years.  
Furthermore, this chapter will discuss the cost of the PSC regime in Paris MoU. And 
the issue of cost efficiency of PSC regime will be analyzed from the economic point 
of view.  
4.2 The effectiveness of PSC regime 
The PSC regime takes effect in two ways: one is through the control action taken in 
inspections; another way is to promote flag States to implement international 
conventions through publishing annual PSC report which contained their performance 
of implementation in the last year. The former is a direct approach while the latter is 
an indirect approach. This part will examine the performance of PSC regime only 
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through the statistics and empirical data published by the Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and 
USCG. There are two reasons for this. On one hand, according to the wordwide 
statistics of PSC in 2004, the port State control inspections activities in these three 
regions account for over 70 percent of the total inspections conducted in the whole 
world. On the other hand, after years of development, the PSC regime in these three 
regions especially in Europe where Paris MoU covered is matured. Therefore the 
statistics data in the three regions are more representative than that in any other 
region. 
4.2.1 The general profile of PSC inspections in the three regions 
As early as in 1992, the Paris MoU Secretariat admitted that, in the absence of any 
better criteria, the quantity of PSC inspections is one indicator that can be relied upon 
in measuring the impact of PSC in the region (Paris MoU, 1992).  
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Figure 1 shows the number of inspections carried out under Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU 
and USCG from 1998 to 2004. The number of inspections in Paris MoU and Tokyo 
MoU steadily increased from 1998 to 2004. However, the increase in Tokyo MoU is 
more swift and violent than that in Paris MoU. The reason behind this is that after 
more than 20 years of development, the Paris MoU is relative mature. While Tokyo 
MoU is still in its rapid grow up stage. The figure also shows the trend of the number 
of inspections conducted by USCG is quite unstable. But the number jumped to its 
historical height in 2004 because of U.S’s intense enthusiasm in implementing ISPS 
Code. Figure 2 shows the number of individual ships that were subject to PSC under 
Paris MoU and USCG from 1998 to 2004. It shows the same trend as the number of 
inspection in Figure 1. With the growing number of inspections carried out, one notes 
the increasing numbers of deficiencies identified during PSC inspection. The numbers 
are given in Figure 3.  
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The MoU annual reports use the concept of “deficiency rate” to express the 
relationship between the number of deficiencies on the one hand, and the number of 
inspections on the other. Figure 4 shows that the trend of the deficiency rate in Paris 
MoU and Tokyo MoU developed in a different way. The general trend of deficiency 
rate in Tokyo MoU rose from 1998 to 2003. It dropped sharply in 2004. While the 
deficiency rate in Paris MoU reached its summit in 2001 and declined in the past 4 
years.  
Deficiency rate under Paris MOU and Tokyo MOU from 1998 to 2004
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That implies that more deficiencies per inspections have been observed in the 6 years. 
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The trend suggests that, very roughly, the “rectification rate” achieved by MoU is also 
increasing. Deficiencies must be rectified before a ship is allowed to leave port. It is 
assumed that, in most instances in which deficiencies are identified, a rectification 
follows (Payoyo, 1994). The rising deficiency rates thus suggest a corresponding rise 
in the rectification rate.  
With regard to the delays or detentions effected in the three regions, Figure 5 shows 
that a different trend of detention numbers in the three regions form 1998 to 2004. In 
2000, Paris MoU detained the most ships in its history and the number of detention 
fell from that year. That is because Paris MoU launched enhanced targeting system in 
2000 (Shiming, 2001). The general trend of the number of detention in Tokyo MoU 
rose in the 7 years. But the number of detention and detention rate sharply declined in 
2004. This trend also happened on Paris MoU. The decline may be attributed to the 
implementation of ISPS Code. From 1st July 2004, the ISPS Code came into force 
and a CIC on the ISPS Code was carried out in Paris MoU and Tokyo MoU. The ISPS 
related detention percentage is about 1%, much lower than the overall detention rate 
of 6.51% in the region during the same period. While the trend of the number of 
detention in USCG developed in an exactly opposite way to that in Tokyo MoU.  
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Figure 6 shows that the trend of detention rate in the three regions basically followed 
the same trend of number of detentions. 
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4.2.2 The Black-Grey-White List and Targeting System 
Every year, the Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and USCG published the information of PSC 
inspections which were conducted in their regions last year. The PSC committees 
analyzed the inspections data and evaluated the performance of flag States through the 
Black-Grey-White List System. Once the performance of a flag State in that year was 
categorized in the Black List, the State would face two serious consequences. One 
was the great politic pressure from the international community that required the State 
taking effective measures to improve the safety level of the ships flying its flag. 
Another was that through the targeting system, all ships flying the flag of black-listed 
State would be targeted as the ships with higher priority to be inspected. The more 
inspections are conducted on the ships flying the flag of the black-listed State, the 
more deficiencies will be observed and more detentions will happened on these ships. 
It is a vicious circle and will cause great financial loss to the flag State. The 
black-listed flag State will be compelled to make appropriate policies to ensure the 
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ships flying its flag comply with international safety and environment protection 
standards. Although some scholars argued the validity of black-listing a flag State 
because the flag State is also a sovereign State, the experiences in Paris MoU, Tokyo 
MoU and USCG show that Black-Grey-White List system which cooperates with 
Targeting system is a powerful tool to enforce ships comply with international 
conventions indirectly.  
4.2.3 Case study 
The PSC performance of Chinese ships before 1998 was very poor. Figure 7, Figure 8 
and Figure 9 provides the performance of Chinese ships in Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU 
and USCG. Before 1998, the 3 Year Rolling Average Detention Rate of Chinese ships 
in the three regions was higher than those of the whole region. Consequentially, China 
was blacklisted by the Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and USCG before 1998. Chinese 
government endured tremendous pressure from international community that required 
improving the safety level of Chinese ships. Chinese shipping companies also 
assumed great financial loss in the shipping market. The China Maritime Safety 
Administration (CMSA) took appropriate measures such as enhancing the safety 
management of the ship companies, the Pre-Voyage inspection and improving the 
safety standard of statutory regulations to reduce the detention rate. These measures 
took effect in 2000. China jumped into the White list and stabilized from 2000. This is 
a good example that PSC regime promotes flag State implementation in an indirect 
way. 
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The performance of Chinese ships under Paris MOU
1.86%2.62%
2.85%3.13%
4.37%5.02%
8.57%
15.90%
17.73%
6.95%
8.01%8.84%
9.25%9.24%9.28%9.78%
10.52%10.44%
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
12.00%
14.00%
16.00%
18.00%
20.00%
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
Year
Figure.7 (Source: Paris MOU Annual Report 1996-2004)
The 3 Year Rolling
Average
Detention Rate of
Chinese Ships 
The 3 Year Roling
Average
Detention Rate
Under Paris MOU
 
The performance of Chinese ships under Tokyo MOU
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The preformance of Chinese ships under USCG
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4.3 The cost efficiency of the PSC regime 
The issue of cost efficiency of the PSC regime concerns the cost spent on the regime 
and the effectiveness. In the present, there is only one report available which contain 
the cost of PSC regime: the Paris MoU 1992 Annual Report. As far as the 
effectiveness of the PSC regime, there is still not any direct study which contained the 
concrete quantity of the effectiveness. However, a study made by the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996 may throw some light on 
the effectiveness of PSC regime through analyzing the financial advantages obtained 
by shipowners as a result of non-observance of applicable international rules and 
standards.  
The Paris MoU Secretariat reports that, in the operation of the Paris MoU from 1982 
to 1992, approximately US $ 25 M was spent to conduct about 12 5000 inspections on 
9 5000 individual ships (Paris MoU, 1992) That means averagely $200 were spent on 
every inspection. According to the Annual Report of Paris MoU in 1994, the 
inspection percentage to the number of ships called in the region and the times of 
inspection for an individual ship were respectively 26.8% and 1.59. Therefore, the 
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cost spent on conducting PSC inspection for an individual ship in the whole year was 
$200×26.8%×1.59 = $85.2 
Another study by OECD in 1996 pointed out for a late 1970s built 30 000 dwt bulk 
carrier operating within the handysize time charter market in 1994, the margin of 
sub-standard operation can be seen to equate to some US $500/day or US 
$182500/year (OECD, 1996) This can be regard as financial advantages obtained by 
this substandard bulk carrier in 1994. The existence of the PSC regime under Paris 
MoU is to ensure this bulk carrier to fully observe applicable international standards. 
In other words, without the PSC regime the shipowner tend to operate this bulk carrier 
in substandard safety level to save operational cost for its survival in the fierce 
shipping market. Therefore, the effectiveness of the PSC regime on this bulk carrier in 
1994 was equated to the financial advantages obtained through sub-standard operation, 
which was $18 2500/year.  
From above analysis, we can draw a conclusion that in 1994, for a late 1970s built 30 
000 dwt bulk carrier operating in Paris MoU, the average PSC inspection cost was 
$85.2/year, while the effectiveness of the PSC regime can be $18 2500/year! It is 
really cost-effective way to ensure this ship to observe appropriate international 
conventions. Although the above cost-benefit analysis only reflected the individual 
case, it still provided a reference about to which extent the PSC regime was 
cost-effective.  
4.4 Conclusion 
From the above discussion, it is clear that the PSC is a very effective regime to 
improve ships safety level in direct or indirect ways in regions where the system 
properly operated. In addition, compared with the benefit of the regime, the cost is so 
little that can be neglected by the shipping industry. However, the PSC regime is not 
congenitally perfect. And with the development of the regime, many new challenges 
which may reduce the effectiveness of the PSC regime emerged.  
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Chapter ? 
 The Challenges to the Current PSC Regime 
5.1 Introduction 
Although port State control is playing a more and more important role in improving 
maritime safety and marine environment protection, it needs to be remembered that 
port State control is an imperfect system operating in an imperfect world. It is neither 
a cure all nor does it absolve others from their responsibilities (AMSA, 2001). There 
are some challenges to the current PSC regime. Some challenges exist because the 
PSC regime itself has inborn limitations. And the others come forth with the 
development of the PSC regime. 
5.2 The inherent limitations of PSC regime 
PSC regime as a supplement to the flag State implementation is not a panacea to cure 
the deficient flag State implementation. It also has its own limitations. The inherent 
limitations of PSC regime fall into two major aspects. Firstly, the scope and depth of 
PSC inspection are limited by time scale and access available to ships and shipowners 
(Shiming, 2001) Secondly, there are many subjective elements in the PSC procedures.  
5.2.1 The limitation to the scope and depth of PSC inspections 
The Procedure For Port State Control provides that:  
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If the certificates are valid and the PSCO's general impression and 
visual observations on board confirm a good standard of maintenance, 
the PSCO should generally confine the inspection to reported or 
observed deficiencies, if any. If, however, the PSCO from general 
impressions or observations on board has clear grounds for believing 
that the ship, its equipment or its crew do not substantially meet the 
requirements, the PSCO should proceed to a more detailed inspection. 
In other words, the ship should be exempted to detailed inspection unless clear 
grounds exist. Once clear grounds exist, the ship will be subject to detailed inspection. 
In this case, they are in fact challenging the authorities of the statutory certificates 
because these certificates are only prima faci evidences that certify the ship and 
shipboard operations comply with applicable international conventions. Although the 
contents contained in these certificates authenticate the vessel observe applicable 
conventions and everything is in good condition, the observed clear grounds are 
enough to make PSCOs to believe that as a matter of fact, the ship, the ship equipment 
and shipboard operation do not meet appropriate requirements. This is also why we 
say PSC regime is the supplement to the flag State implementation. 
However, a question arises in this situation: to which extent can a detailed inspection 
be? There are two aspects to this question: one is how many items can be included in 
the detailed inspection, another is how deep could a detailed inspection be.  
The ship safety and shipboard safety operations involve many items. According to the 
Form of PSC report, there are 444 items can be included in one PSC inspection. (See 
Appendix D) The scope of these items is quite comprehensive. They range from 
shipboard documents to equipment and safety operations by crew on board. However, 
because of limited human resources and time of ship in port, it is impossible for 
PSCOs to inspect every item in one inspection. In practices, the PSCOs can only 
select some items in one inspection to be inspected. Therefore, the scope of inspection 
is inexhaustive though it is a detailed inspection.  
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The depth of detailed inspection is more complicated. The ship, ship equipment and 
shipboard operations involved many smaller details and layers of the ship. When the 
statutory certificates are issued, there is, however, also need for a large number of 
other certificates and other kinds of documentation to be issued for verifying 
compliance of smaller details of the ship with the relevant requirements. Only by 
having a several layer structure of certificates, the ship certificates can be issued 
(Jönsson, 2005). Therefore, when the detailed inspection is carried out, the depth of 
inspection should also touch smaller details of the ship and all layers structure of 
certificates. However, the inspections by PSCOs can not be so detailed because of the 
limited technical methods and professional knowledge level of PSCOs. For example, 
although the Cargo Safety Equipment Certificate and Product Certificate issued by 
ROs to certify the lifeboat on board meet the relevant requirements, the PSCOs can 
inspect every detail of the lifeboat when clear grounds exist, such as the PSCO find 
the lifeboat deform seriously. However, some particulars such as the longitude 
strength of the lifeboat and strength of the material can not be scrutinized under the 
conditions on board and the technical methods available by PSCOs.  
5.2.2 The subjective elements in the PSC regime  
Inevitably, the subjective elements exist in the PSC regime because it is the PSCOs to 
conduct PSC inspections. Generally, the subjective elements may take effect in two 
processes: the decision-making process on how detail will the inspection be; the 
decision-making process on which remedial actions should be taken after deficiencies 
are observed. 
As the analysis made in section 5.2.1 point out, the scope of the detailed inspection 
are extensive to about 444 items. Therefore, it is basically up to PSCOs to decide 
which items should be included in one inspection. The scope of the chose items 
depend on the professional knowledge level and preference of PSCOs, or in other 
words to which extent that the PSCOs are familiar with the specific aspects of the ship. 
Generally, a PSCO is inclined to choose the items which are known well by himself.  
Chapter ?               The Challenges to the Current PSC Regime 
  39  
Another process where the subjective elements exist is designating control measures 
after deficiencies are observed. The remedial actions can range from “rectified the 
deficiency in three month” to “detention” (See Appendix E). Deciding which control 
measures to be taken is also depended on PSCO, especially when PSCO decide to 
detain a ship. Although the PSC procedure requires the PSCO should exercise 
professional judgment to determine whether to detain a ship until the deficiencies are 
corrected or to allow it to sail with certain deficiencies to the next port, the 
professional judgment is also up to the PSCOs and different PSCOs will have 
different judgments and interpretations to the same deficiency. 
5.2.3 The impact of the inherent limitations to the PSC regime 
The inherent limitations have two impacts to the PSC regime. On one hand, the 
limited scope and depth of PSC inspections reduce the effectiveness of the PSC 
regime. Once the scope and depth of inspection can not cover all aspects and every 
detail of the ship, ship equipment and shipboard safety operation, the effectiveness of 
the PSC regime can not reach its maximum. On the other hand, the subjective 
elements in the course of inspection impact the fairness of the PSC regime. For the 
same deficiencies, different PSCOs will take different control measures which are 
based their individual professional judgments. Different control measures will bring 
different impacts to ship operations. The fairness of the PSC regime is abated. More 
seriously, ship sometimes is unduly detained by PSCOs, which will be discussed 
latter.  
5.3 The imbalanced development of the PSC regime 
The development of the PSC regime is not homogeneous between the MoUs. Even 
within the same region of the MoU, the development of PSC regime between different 
member States is also unbalanced. These unhomogeneity greatly dilute the 
effectiveness of the PSC regime because it is still beneficial to all concerned when 
harmonization of the various areas of port State control administration and inspection 
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procedures can be achieved on an inter-regional basis (IMO, 2004). 
5.3.1 The imbalance of the PSC development between the MoUs 
Although PSC regime has been incorporated into UNCOLS and major marine 
conventions and the first regional MoU operated more than 20 years, the operation of 
the PSC regimes all over the world never achieved uniformity. The unhomogeneity 
between the MoUs existed in many aspects of the operation of the PSC regime. Not 
only some contexts of the MoUs themselves but also the practices and PSC 
performance of the each MoU are not homogeneous.  
As far as the MoUs themselves are concerned, the contexts of the agreements are not 
same. Appendix B Table 2 gives a comparative table of the existing nine PSC regional 
agreements. This table shows the relevant instruments of the MoUs which provide the 
legal background of the PSC regime are not consistent. The TONNAGE 69 
Convention which set the benchmark for other conventions is not included as relevant 
instrument under Mediterranean MoU. The member States of AcuerdoViña del Mar 
MoU can not enforce the requirements of the ILO Convention No. 147 (Minimum 
Standard, 1976) on foreign ships because it did not accept the convention as the 
relevant instrument. Even some MoUs included ILO 147 convention as their relevant 
instrument, the adoption was only conditional. For example, although Tokyo MoU 
adopted ILO 147 as its relevant instrument, the implementation of ILO Convention 
No. 147 will not require any alterations to structure or facilities involving 
accommodation for ships whose keels were laid down before April 1, 1994 (Tokyo 
MoU, 2004). Apart from the relevant instruments, the target inspection rate set by the 
MoUs ranged from 10% to 75%. The unhomogeneous contents of MoUs inevitably 
led the unhomogeneous of the practice and performance of the PSC regime in 
different MoUs. 
The practices and performance of the nine MoUs and USCG also reinforced the above 
point. The overall inspection rate in the region can be an indicator reflecting how 
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many inspections have been done on the ships called in this region.  
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Figure 10 shows the overall inspection rate in Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and USCG. 
The highest overall inspection rate was 78% and achieved by Tokyo MoU in 2002, 
while the lowest one was 19.5% and achieved by USCG in 2003. 
Another indicator – the detention rate of a flag State in different MoUs may vividly 
reflect the imbalance of the PSC regimes in the whole world. Theoretically, the PSC 
inspection performance of a flag State especially a flag State of convenience in 
different regions all over the world should be the same, because ocean is free for ships 
to sail. However, the truth tell us another story. 
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The detention rate of Panamanian ships In 2003
5.78%
8.26%
3.63% 3.48%
6.99%
14.58%
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
12.00%
14.00%
16.00%
MOUs
Figure.11 (Source: The 5 MOUs and USCG Annual Report 2003)
Paris MOU
Acuerdo Vina del
Mar MOU
Tokyo MOU
Indian MOU
Black Dea MOU
USCG
 
In 2002, Panama register held 21.7% share of the world fleet and was regard as the 
largest flag State (Francisco, 2003). Figure 11 shows the detention rate of ships flying 
flag of Panama in 2003. The detention rate in the 6 regions which almost covered this 
planet ranged from 3.48% in U.S to 14.58% in Latin American area. It is interesting to 
note that although U.S is supposed to have the strictest PSC regime, the detention rate 
of Panamanian ships under USCG is the lowest in the 6 regions.  
5.3.2 The imbalance of the PSC development within the region of MoU 
Even inside the MoUs, the PSC regime never reached homogenous. The Tokyo MoU 
can be a good example. Appendix F Table 3 gives the conventions status. The ILO 
147 only has 4 signatory States in Asia-Pacific area. Appendix G Table 4 provided the 
statistical data of the Tokyo MoU in 2004. The inspection rates of member Maritime 
Authorities ranged from 0.80% to 74.41%. Similarly, the detention rate in this region 
ranged from 0 to 22.68% 
5.3.3 The reasons behind the unbalanced development of the PSC regime 
Generally, there are mainly two reasons for the imbalance between and inside the 
MoUs. On one hand, the political, economic and culture backgrounds of regional 
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MoUs and the member States are quite different. For example, most member States of 
Paris MoU are developed countries and they stress the importance of accommodation, 
working, food and catering conditions on board. Therefore, as Parties to the ILO 
Convention No 147, they emphasize the inspections on items related to ILO 147 when 
their PSCOs carry out PSC inspections. On the contrary, most member States in 
Tokyo MoU are developing countries. Only 4 States are Parties to the ILO 147 
convention. Therefore the PSCOs in the other States can not inspect the ILO related 
items in the PSC inspections. According to the 2004 annual reports of the two MoUs, 
the percentage of ILO 147 related deficiencies to the total deficiencies observed in the 
two regions are respectively 13.51% and 3.24%. 
On the other hand, different MoUs develop in different stages and a MoU in different 
stages has different performance of PSC inspections. The oldest MoU is Paris MoU 
which was established more than 20 years ago. Now, it is mature and its performance 
has become stable. The youngest MoU is Riyadh MoU which was established in 2004 
and still in its infant stage. When a MoU was in its inception stage, it usually took a 
while for the regional MoUs to establishing their authority and unifying their PSC 
practices (SEAPOL, 1999). The following figure about the regional inspection 
percentages in Tokyo MoU can give a good example. 
The inspection percentage in Tokyo MOU from 1994-2004
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Figure 12 illustrate that in 1994 when the Tokyo MoU began to operate, only 32% 
ships called in this region were inspected. The inspection percentage increased 
gradually to the peak point in 2002. From this year on, the inspection percentage 
stabilized at around 75%, which is the target rate of Tokyo MoU. 
5.3.4 The negative effect of the imbalance 
Without homogeneity and uniformity between and inside the MoUs, the effectiveness 
of PSC regime especially the effectiveness of the well-operated regime will be greatly 
abated. With the imbalanced PSC development between the MoUs, the unscrupulous 
operators of the substandard ships will seek regions have low inspections percentage 
to avoid the disturbance of PSC inspections. With the unhomogeneity inside the 
MoUs, the operators of substandard ships will divert their ship to ports in a region 
with lower detention rate (Shiming, 2001). And the shipowners of these substandard 
ships continue to enjoy the financial advantages over the ships in good conditions. 
This will lead unfair competition in the shipping market. The substandard ships will 
slip through the PSC regime which is the last safety net. In addition, the imbalance of 
PSC regime can also result in unfair competition and vulnerability for ports of those 
countries that do conduct proper inspection. 
5.3.5 Case study 
On 3rd Feb 2006, ferry “Al Salam Boccaccio 98” carrying 1415 passengers and 220 
cars sunk in the Red Sea. She left Dhuba, Saudi Arabia for Safaga, Egypt with 
passengers mostly Egyptians. Survivors said that a fire broke out, which escalated out 
of control, explosion was heard, and ship listed then sank. According to report, 424 
survivors were rescued. Close to 1000 persons were missing. International Maritime 
Organization secretary general Efthimios Mitropoulos has led global expressions of shock and 
grief at the sinking of the Egyptian passenger ro-ro ferry Al Salam Boccaccio 98 (Lloyd’s List, 
2006). 
The 36-year-old, 11,779 gross registered tonnage ro-ro ferry had undergone several 
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conversions to increase its capacity to 1,400 passengers and had been sailing under 
the Panamanian flag since 1999. Previously it had flown the Italian flag under a 
different name. RINA had classed the vessel since it was built (in Italy) in 1970. The 
ferry was operated by Egyptian El Salam Maritime Company (Kennedy, 2006) 
Faced with the pictures of grieved relatives of lost person, people can’t help asking 
why this tragedy happened. Although the accident was still under investigation, what 
was becoming very evident, however, was that this ferry was not able to trade in 
Scandinavia before it was transferred to Red Sea, following the regional introduction 
of the Stockholm rules (Corbett, 2006) 
Following the Herald of Free Enterprise accident in 1987 and the Estonia in 1994, 
international regulations were formulated for ro-ro passenger vessels that provided 
improvements (post-2000) for the construction and operation of these vessels. This 
so-called "Stockholm Agreement" sets out specific technical solutions to safeguard 
these ships and ensure that a vessel is able to stay afloat during an emergency (for 
instance, with 50 cm of water on deck) (Kennedy, 2006). Apparently, ferry “Al Salam 
Boccaccio 98” could not meet the requirements of the Stockholm Agreement. After 
this ferry transferred to Red Sea to avoid the rigorous regulation in Europe, it 
continued to sail between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Egypt is the member State of 
Mediterranean MoU where the target inspection rate is only 15%. And Saudi Arabia is 
the member State of Riyadh MoU which was established in 2004 and still in its early 
stage. The MoU need time to establish its authority and unify their PSC practices. The 
imbalance of PSC regime among the Paris MoU, Mediterranean MoU and Riyadh 
MoU gave living space to Al Salam Boccaccio 98. In other words, this ferry slip 
through the maritime safety net weaved by the three MoUs. 
5.4 The challenges to the PSCOs  
The role of PSCO in the PSC regime is extreme important because he (she) is located 
in the center of the PSC regime. The professional knowledge level, human resources 
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and ethical principle of PSCOs greatly impact the effectiveness and fairness of PSC 
regime. The PSCOs are facing three challenges: the shortage of PSCOs in some 
regions; more and more higher qualifications requirements to PSCOs; ethical 
principle of PSCOs. 
5.4.1 The shortage of PSCOs in some regions 
Although a PSCO is not necessarily required to sit any standardized examination and 
does not need to have prior experience at sea, the number of PSCOs in the region 
where the ports have heavy traffic is quit low (Özçayır, 2003). Appendix H Table 5 
gives the number of inspected ships per PSCO in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) Economies. In Hongkong and Korea, the numbers of PSCOs in 2002 were 
respectively 13 and 10. Another example, the South Africa Department of Transport 
address in its 1998 annual report: 
South Africa is situated on a particularly busy corner of the world’s 
major sea routes. Frequently, weather conditions are dreadful and 
many casualties occur. In this region, port State control is carried at 
all the seven commercial ports by 24 professional deck and engineer 
ship surveyors of the Chief Directorate of the Shipping. These 
surveyors have to do a multiplicity of Merchant Shipping Act related 
tasks concerning the ships register, certification of crew and pollution 
monitoring. Therefore, in this region, statutory surveys take 
preference and with staff shortages port State control is ineffective in 
some ports.  
The reason behind this is that there is a shortage of skilled and experienced persons in 
the shipping industry and that future port State control officers would be difficult to 
recruit in order to ensure that port State control inspections maintain the same high 
standards (IMO, 2004). According to a study by Baltic and International Maritime 
Council (BIMCO) in 2000, there will be a shortage of some 46,000 ship’s officer by 
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2010 (Grey, 2005).  
The direct consequence of shortage of PSCOs is the great workloads for PSCOs. In 
Korea, an inspector averagely conducted 184.6 inspections in 2002 (KMI, 2003). The 
overweight workload for PSCOs inevitably lead that the quality of inspections can not 
be assured.  
5.4.2 The professional knowledge level of PSCOs 
PSC inspections are highly professional job which can only be accomplished by 
experienced inspectors with professional knowledge. During the process of 
inspections, the inspectors use professional knowledge to decide if the ship, ship 
equipment and shipboard operations comply with the applicable standards. 
Particularly, the PSCO should exercise professional judgment to determine whether to 
detain a ship (IMO, 1999). For the PSCOs, the professional knowledge level has two 
sides. First, the PSCOs must acquire necessary knowledge of the provisions of the 
applicable conventions and instruments before they are authorized to carry out PSC 
inspections by port State. Second, the PSCOs must continuously update their 
knowledge with respect to instruments related to port State control.  
Before PSCOs begin their career as PSC inspectors, training should be provided to 
them to acquire necessary knowledge. However, the scope of the necessary 
knowledge is quite extensive, which includes conventions, codes, IMO resolutions 
and numerical guidelines. And the contents of instruments are extremely complicated. 
For example, the conventions have SOLAS, MARPOL73/78, STCW 78 as Amended 
in 1995, LOADLINE, etc. Furthermore, all of these conventions have amendments. 
The amendments apply to ships which were constructed in different years. Different 
types of ships also have different applicable regulations in these conventions. For 
PSCOs, it is a great challenge to make acquainted with these instruments.  
With the development of international conventions, more and more amendments and 
codes are adopted and become compulsory requirements to applicable ships, such as 
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Annex ? to MARPOL 73/78, ISPS Code. Thus, the PSCOs must update their 
knowledge to keep up with the development of conventions. The PSC Procedure 
requires that periodical seminars for PSCOs should be held in order to update their 
knowledge with respect to instruments related to port State control (IMO, 1999). This 
is not a big problem for the developed countries which have considerably bigger 
budgets. But some developing countries have limited financial support to get their 
PSCOs’ professional knowledge level improved. The PSCOs can not receive 
sufficient knowledge update training and can not effectively carry out PSC 
inspections.  
5.4.3 The ethical principle of PSCOs 
The PSCOs should hold integrity in ethic because they represent fairness and have 
power to take control measures which can bring financial loss to shipowners. The 
PSCOs and the persons assisting them should have no commercial interest, either in 
the port of inspection or in the ships inspected, nor should PSCOs be employed by or 
undertake work on behalf of recognized organizations (IMO, 1999). 
However, like any other system where human beings are involved, the port State 
control system can be abused (Özçayır, 2003). In recent years, port State control, so 
often depicted as a knight in shining armour in the battle against substandard shipping, 
has found itself fending off accusations of corruption (Corbett, 2004) George Barclay, 
director of the international port State control database Equasis, also admitted: “This 
is a problem that exist to a greater or lesser extent all over the world and will 
unfortunately remain for a while” (Fairplay, 2004). Even more worse, the industry’s 
silence on the issue ultimately makes it hard to assess accurately how widespread 
corruption is (Fairplay, 2004).  
There are mainly two reasons for the rampancy of the corruption. Firstly, as section 
5.2.2 point out, there are many subjective elements in the PSC regime. These 
subjective elements set aside space for the corruption. The PSC inspectors are free to 
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choose control measures once deficiencies are found. Secondly, the financial 
incentives that creates for low-paid, overworked and undervalued port officials is one 
of the driving force behind the abuses of the port State regime. PSC will always be a 
problem area, as the inspectors are low paid and see great opportunities for a quick 
buck (Slater, 2004). 
The abuse of power by some PSC inspectors badly impairs the integrity, reputation 
and effectiveness of PSC regime. If the endemic of corruption is rampant in the whole 
world, the PSC regime can not exert its effect as a safety net. And even worse, it can 
be a burden of the whole shipping industry. 
5.5 Undue detention 
5.5.1 Overview of undue detention 
Detention is a very serious matter. Just as John Hare pointed out in 1997: 
If a chartered vessel is facing cancellation dates and is unable to 
complete loading or discharge by reason of a port State control 
detention, her owner would clearly suffer considerable financial 
losses. These losses may be mirrored down the charter party, and 
could be compounded by publicized allegations that the owner’s 
hitherto good trading name has been tarnished.  
Undue detention is to detain a ship for what subsequently and in retrospect turns out 
to be insufficient cause (Hare, 1997) The Procedure For Port State Control provides: 
“when exercising control, all possible efforts should be made to avoid a ship being 
unduly detained or delayed” (IMO, 1999). Nevertheless, undue detentions happen 
occasionally in the worldwide. If there is an Achilles heel in current international port 
State control practice it is that authorities may be concerned by their possible 
exposure to actions for wrongful detention (Hare, 1997). 
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To avoid ships being unduly detained, the international conventions also provide that 
an unduly detained ship will be entitle to compensation and can appeal against the 
detention if the detained ship can prove wrongful detention (SOLAS, 1974). But it is 
seldom to find any successful cases where an owner has successfully recovered 
compensation following wrongful detention by a PSCO (Özçayır, 2003). The reason 
behind this situation is that in any instance of alleged undue detention or delay the 
burden of proof lies with the owner or operator of the ship (ASOC, 2003). 
5.5.2 The reasons of undue detention 
Generally, there are mainly two reasons for the undue detention. One is that the 
PSCOs have insufficient professional knowledge and make inappropriate judgment. 
Another reason is that there are still insufficient guidelines available to help PSCOs 
make decision of detention.  
The international conventions, codes, resolutions and guidelines are very complicated 
instrument system for PSCOs to command. Furthermore, these instruments are not 
invariable and are constantly amended. With the development of shipping industry, 
more and more instruments are adopted and come into force. This raises huge 
challenges to PSCOs. A qualified and experienced PSCO need a long time training 
and should study the relevant instruments continuously. In case a PSCO has 
insufficient knowledge in one aspect, he (she) may make inappropriate judgment 
based on the insufficient knowledge and unduly detain the ship. 
Even the PSCOs have sufficient professional knowledge, the insufficient guidelines 
on PSC detention may also lead the PSCO unduly detain the ship. The PSC procedure 
provides guidelines on detention and MoUs provide a list of detainable deficiencies, 
but those are not enough for PSCOs to make professional judgment. For example, 
when the ship is found to be deficient, a combination of deficiencies of a less serious 
nature may also warrant the detention of the ship (IMO, 1999). However, there are no 
any guidelines on what is the combination of deficiencies of a less serious nature that 
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may lead a detention. The PSCOs meet a big problem in this situation and undue 
detention may happen.  
5.5.3 Case study 
The “Lantau Peak” case is a case that the vessel suffered undue detention and the 
owner successfully recovered compensation following the wrongful detention by 
PSCOs. In an important Federal Court of Canada decision on April 5, 2004 in 
Maritime Consortium Management vs. Her Majesty the Queen in the right in Canada, 
the shipowner was awarded $5,969,072 plus costs against the Crown in respect of the 
negligent conduct of Canadian Port State Control inspectors and their superiors in 
Vancouver and Ottawa with respect to the inspection and detention of the bulk carrier 
Lantau Peak (Hawkins, 2005). 
On April 5, 1997, the Lantau Peak arrived in Vancouver Harbour from Japan to 
conduct some minor repairs and then load coal for a return voyage to Japan. Before 
loading, the vessel had planned to repair hull frames found to be detached during the 
voyage. On arrival alongside the berth, Lantau Peak was inspected by two Canadian 
Steamship inspectors following which it was ordered detained as a measure of Ports 
State Control. The vessel remained in detention for 130 days until August 13, 1997. 
On departure the Lantau Peak sailed in ballast to China for extensive hull repairs 
required by the terms of its release from detention. The detention was imposed 
primarily on the basis of the inspector’s opinion that the hull frames were wasted by 
corrosion beyond what was considered an acceptable limit. The limit imposed by the 
inspectors was 17 percent of the original as-built thickness. The shipowner argued the 
classification society, Class NK, requirements should be applied, not some unique 
Vancouver standard. The shipowner commenced suit in the Federal Court of Canada 
against Her Majesty and the local inspectors seeking damages for unnecessary repair 
costs, off-hire expenses, port costs and bunker expenses. In a lengthy 189 pages 
decision, Justice Campbell hold that his arbitrary determination was inconsistent with 
the standards of both the flag administration and classification society and its basis 
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was not substantiated (Campbell, 2004). The ship owner was improperly required to 
undertake unnecessary and extensive repairs in the Canadian port, rather than being 
allowed to sail to a foreign port where repairs would have been less costly (Fairplay, 
2004). The Port State Control inspectors and their supervisors in Transport Canada 
were negligent in the conduct of their duties (Hawkins, 2005). 
In this case, the root cause of the undue detention rested that the PSC inspectors made 
a wrong judgment based on an arbitrary standard. The arbitrary standard required that 
the maximum wastage of hull frame not exceed 17 percent of the original as-built 
thickness, which was not international agreed standard contained in any international 
conventions. The PSC inspectors referred to wrong standard and have inadequate 
knowledge on the limitation of the wastage of hull frame. 
5.6 Conclusion 
The PSC regime is far from a perfect system to combat substandard ship and improve 
maritime safety through promoting flag State implementation. More or less, the 
inherent limitations and the weakness in the course of development impair its efficacy. 
Large room still exists for the PSC regime to improve its performance. Policies and 
measures need to be taken by the international maritime community to enlarge the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the system. Some proposals have been adopted by 
IMO, while some proposals are under discussion.  
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Chapter ?  
Recommendations and Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
Although PSC regime has achieved partial success, there is a mass room for the 
improvement of the regime. There are many approaches available to improve the 
performance of PSC regime. Most of them are to enhance the homogeneity of the PSC 
regime through worldwide coordination and cooperation. No matter what approach is 
employed, the active participations of all stakeholders in the maritime community 
such as shipowners, classification societies, flag States and port State are essential. 
6.2 Promote uniformity of the PSC regime worldwide 
The uniformity of the PSC regime has two tiers: the uniformity within the region of 
the MoU and the uniformity between the MoUs. To promote uniformity of the PSC 
regime worldwide, the two tiers of uniformity need to be improved simultaneously.  
For the improvement of uniformity within the region of the MoU, the PSC committee 
of each MoU may play an important role. First, the PSC committee of each MoU 
should develop a consistent PSC manual, preferably based on the PSC manual of 
Paris MoU which is relatively mellow. The PSC manual provides the detailed 
guidelines on the procedures of PSC inspection to unify the PSC practices. Second, 
establish PSC auditing mechanisms in the context of the Voluntary IMO Member 
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State Audit Scheme. As far as the member States of IMO are concerned, their 
maritime Authorities’ responsibilities of implementing international conventions rest 
on not only ensuring ships flying their own flag to observe applicable standards as 
flag State implementation, but also establishment an effective and consistent PSC 
regime as a port State. The performance of PSC inspections is an important aspect of 
the voluntary audit scheme. The MoU can also introduce the PSC self-assessment 
scheme among the member Authorities of the MoU. In accordance with the PSC 
performance of each Authority, the MoU may coordinate the practices of member 
Authorities to achieve the uniformity within the region of MoU. Third, urge the 
member Authorities of MoU that have not ratified all relevant instruments to do so as 
soon as possible. Particularly, the MoU should promote the accession to the 
conventions which aim to improve living and working conditions on board ships by 
States of member authorities. 
For the Uniformity between the MoUs, information exchange should be promoted. 
Port State control is more effective when implemented on a regional basis. However, 
it is still beneficial to all concerned when harmonization of the various areas of port 
State control administration and inspection procedures can be achieved on an 
inter-regional basis (IMO, 2004). To this end, all Port State Control Committees are 
urged to keep each other fully informed of all new port State control initiatives 
undertaken in their respective regions, in order to review whether reciprocal measures 
can be introduced. Also, though the coordination of IMO, the PSC committees of 
MoUs should enhance harmonization of coding systems, including those for ports and 
places of inspection. 
6.3 Enhance the transparency of the PSC system 
For the success of the PSC, there is an urgent need for more transparency. 
Transparency could not be the solution in eliminating substandard ships but surely it 
is a step in the right direction (Cubbin, 2001).  Some shipowners still consider the 
risk of non-compliance to be outweighed by their commercial interest or survival in a 
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harsh market. Some relevant industry players are still more concerned about their 
market share rather than the problem of substandard shipping. However, exposing 
them to the public will surely benefit this world by raising the quality level of the 
whole shipping industry. The publicized detention list will deter charterers to contract 
bad quality ships. This trend has already emerged in the US where many major oil 
companies are under public pressure not to charter ships with bad records (Shiming, 
2001). In addition, to some extent transparency can prevent the abuse of PSC by some 
inspectors.  
One measure to increase transparency is continuous publication of detailed 
information on a regular basis on detained ships, including the names of owners and 
various commercial interests such as entities and charterers. More transparency is 
being achieved as information on all appropriate parties involved in ships under 
detention is made available to the port State. Another measure is to publish annual 
report by every maritime Authority and MoU. Through the annual report, an overview 
of the performance of port States and MoUs will be presented to the public yearly. 
The port States with poor performance may receive pressure from public that require 
them improving their PSC activities. 
6.4 Promote the information exchange worldwide 
The most obvious advantage of the information exchange is to avoid too frequent PSC 
inspections on ships, especially on quality ships, while at the same time save valuable 
inspection resources and cost to inspect the potential high-risk ships. Although the 
existing nine MoUs have set up their own information center, some of them have no 
computer network enabling their member States to store their inspection data in a 
central database for use by other members, none of which are able to satisfactorily 
exchange data with any of the others due to problems with technical IT compatibility. 
To promote the information exchange worldwide, the first and the most important is 
to help some of the developing MoUs to establish regional PSC computer databases. 
Second, continue to improve the regional port State control information systems and 
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to work toward full exchange of information among the existing nine regional PSC 
regimes and the USCG. This can be done by improving contact mechanisms amongst 
the MoU secretariats and by facilitating the flow of information between MoU 
information centres on action taken against sub-standard shipping. 
6.5 Develop detailed guidelines on PSC for PSCOs  
With the adoption of conventions such as International Convention on the Control of 
Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships (AFS), International Convention on the 
Management of Ballast Water and Sediments (BWM), more and more guidelines on 
enforcing PSC aspects of these conventions are needed to help PSCOs carry out 
inspections. These guidelines should be exhaustive enough to cover the every detailed 
requirement of the conventions. After the guidelines on PSC inspections were 
developed, they also need to be amended according to the practices in realities. 
Apart from the IMO conventions, the enforcement of PSC aspects of ILO conventions 
also need guidelines to help PSCOs conduct inspections living and working 
conditions on board. The draft Consolidated Maritime Labour Convention (CLMC) is 
submitted to ILO for adoption. Developing and implementing an inspection regime 
that is based on the new ILO convention is urgent. This regime will enhance the 
protection of the workers concerned and reflect the greater consistency, clarity, 
adaptability and general applicability that the consolidation of the more than 60 
maritime labour instruments will bring to the rapidly developing, globalized maritime 
sector. 
6.6 Strengthen the recruiting and training of PSCOs 
The qualification of the PSCOs is the key to the success of the PSC regime. The 
public acceptance and credibility of port State control depends greatly on the 
professional attitude and skills of PSCOs and that suitably trained seafarers have a 
crucial role in achieving safe, secure and efficient shipping on clean oceans, and 
making sure that port State control inspections maintain the expected high standards 
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(Tokyo MoU, 2005) Sufficient human resources should be available for the PSC 
regime and the professional knowledge level of PSCOs should be improves 
continuously. The following measures may be taken for these purposes: 
First, appropriate programs should be instituted to attract and recruit qualified persons 
to become port State control officers. This involves encouraging investment in 
infrastructure, improving working conditions and, ultimately, encouraging more 
persons to join the team of PSCO. Second, continue and enhance regional training 
programs for PSCOs. The trainings have various types which can serve for different 
levels. Besides the present basic training course, fellowship training and seminars for 
PSCOs, the PSCO exchange programme which has obtained good effect in some 
regions should be popularized. The PSCO exchange programme is intend to establish 
a two-way PSCOs exchange in the region, whereby each Authority could send out 
their officers to another Authority in exchange of receiving officers from that 
Authority.  
6.7 Intensify the Targeting System 
The targeting systems can identify high risk ships for priority inspections while 
leaving ships of prudent shipowners “in peace” as a reward for their good 
performance. High-risk ships will be inspected more frequently than ships with a 
lower risk profile and compliance measures taken, if necessary. At the same time the 
precious PSC resources can be utilized more productively. In the present, the targeting 
system runs very well in Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and USCG. The other MoUs should 
be recommended to follow these examples especially considering their relatively 
shortage of resources so that the relatively high percentage of substandard ships can 
be targeted more precisely. In addition, the targeting system based on a ship’s risk 
profile can be improved to identify the companies operating sub-standard ships. 
Through targeting the company with poor safety performance, the effectiveness of the 
PSC regime can be improved.  
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6.8 Conclusion 
The primarily responsibility of keeping the ship in compliance with international 
standards rests on the shipowners, flag States and other relevant industry stakeholders. 
The development of the PSC regime is the world reaction to the failure of shipowners 
and flag States in fulfilling their responsibilities. PSC is only a back-up but not a 
substitute for flag States enforcement, and it is in no way responsible for foreign 
ship’s safety standards. It does not relieve the responsibility of flag States, owners and 
other relevant industry players imposed by international legislation to do their jobs 
properly and responsibly. 
The legal basis and procedures of PSC were set up in the past decades. Its efficacy can 
be extended if PSC is carried out on a regional basis. With the development of 
regional PSC MoUs, the PSC regime is recognized by the world maritime community 
as a more and more effective means in achieving safe, secure and efficient shipping 
on clean oceans. So far, the PSC regime has achieved partial success in promoting the 
safety level of the shipping. However, the PSC regime is far less perfect in achieving 
it’s goal. 
To make the PSC regime more effective, there is still a lot of work to be done. 
Measures in improving the effectiveness of PSC included promoting the uniformity of 
PSC regime worldwide, enhanced transparency through increased information 
exchange within regions and inter-regionally, strengthening the recruiting and training 
of PSCOs and intensifying the targeting system. IMO and PSC committees of MoUs 
can play active roles so that all these measures can be taken in a globally harmonized 
and consistent manner.  
In a word, PSC regime is effective, but it faces some challenges. Great efforts still 
need to be done by stakeholders to improve its efficacy. The ultimate goal is to 
achieve safe, secure, efficient shipping on clean oceans, which is one of the oldest 
industries in the history of mankind. 
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Appendix A: Table 1 Summary of status of conventions at 31 January 2005 
Instrument Entry into force date 
No. of 
Contracting 
States 
% world 
tonnage* 
 IMO Convention 17-Mar-58 164 98.56 
 1991 amendments - 87 83.58 
SOLAS 1974 25-May-80 155 98.52 
SOLAS Protocol 1978 01-May-81 107 94.99 
SOLAS Protocol 1988 03-Feb-00 77 66.84 
Stockholm Agreement 1996 01-Apr-97 9 9.58 
LL 1966 21-Jul-68 155 98.49 
LL Protocol 1988 03-Feb-00 73 63.28 
TONNAGE 1969 18-Jul-82 142 98.25 
COLREG 1972 15-Jul-77 146 97.60 
CSC 1972 06-Sep-77 76 61.11 
1993 amendments - 8 4.76 
SFV Protocol 1993 - 10 9.71 
STCW 1978 28-Apr-84 148 98.50 
STCW-F 1995 - 4 3.26 
SAR 1979 22-Jun-85 83 52.05 
STP 1971 02-Jan-74 17 23.14 
SPACE STP 1973 02-Jun-77 16 22.30 
INMARSAT C 1976 16-Jul-79 89 92.22 
INMARSAT OA 1976 16-Jul-79 87 91.35 
1994 amendments - 40 29.10 
FAL 1965  05-Mar-67 100 65.84 
MARPOL 73/78 (Annex I/II) 02-Oct-83 130 97.07 
MARPOL 73/78 (Annex III) 01-Jul-92 115 92.99 
MARPOL 73/78 (Annex IV) 27-Sep-03 100 54.35 
MARPOL 73/78 (Annex V) 31-Dec-88 119 95.23 
MARPOL Protocol 1997 (Annex 
VI) 19-May-05 19 60.04 
LC 1972 30-Aug-75 81 69.85 
1978 amendments - 20 19.23 
LC Protocol 1996 - 21 12.02 
INTERVENTION 1969 06-May-75 82 71.79 
INTERVENTION Protocol 1973 30-Mar-83 47 46.08 
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CLC 1969 19-Jun-75 45 4.81 
CLC Protocol 1976 08-Apr-81 55 55.66 
CLC Protocol 1992 30-May-96 104 93.44 
FUND Protocol 1976 22-Nov-94 33 47.41 
FUND Protocol 1992 30-May-96 93 88.49 
FUND Protocol 2000 27-Jun-01 - - 
FUND Protocol 2003 - 8 9.47 
NUCLEAR 1971 15-Jul-75 17 19.76 
PAL 1974 28-Apr-87 30 37.47 
PAL Protocol 1976 30-Apr-89 24 37.17 
PAL Protocol 1990 - 4 0.77 
PAL Protocol 2002 - - - 
LLMC 1976 01-Dec-86 47 49.75 
LLMC Protocol 1996 13-May-04 15 14.94 
SUA 1988 01-Mar-92 115 81.04 
SUA Protocol 1988 01-Mar-92 104 76.95 
SALVAGE 1989 14-Jul-96 48 36.77 
OPRC 1990 13-May-95 82 63.67 
HNS Convention 1996 - 8 5.37 
OPRC/HNS 2000 - 11 16.11 
BUNKERS CONVENTION 2001 - 6 4.09 
AFS  CONVENTION 2001 - 10 9.18 
BWM CONVENTION 2004 - -                  -
* Source:  Lloyd's Register of Shipping/World Fleet Statistics as at 31 December 2003 
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Appendix B: Table 2 Port State control agreements: comparative table 
 
Paris MoU Acuerdo de Viña del Mar Tokyo MoU 
Participating 
Maritime Authorities 
and Associate 
Members 
20  
Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Russian Federation, Slovenia Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom 
12  
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, 
Venezuela 
18  
Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Fiji, Hong 
Kong (China), Indonesia, Japan, Republic  of 
Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New 
Guinea, Philippines, Russian Federation, 
Singapore, Thailand, Vanuatu and Viet Nam 
Co-operating 
Members Cyprus, Lithuania and Malta   
Observers Estonia, Latvia, United States, IMO, ILO, 
Tokyo MoU, Caribbean MoU, Mediterranean 
MoU and Black Sea MoU 
IMO, ROCRAM, United States Brunei, Macao (China) Solomon Islds*, United 
States, IMO, ILO, ESCAP, Paris MoU, Indian 
Ocean MoU and Viña del Mar Agreement 
Target inspection rate 25 % annual inspection rate per country 15 % annual inspection rate per 
country within 3 years 
75 % annual regional inspection rate 
Relevant 
instruments 
LL 66 and LL PROT 88      SOLAS 74  
SOLAS PROT 78 and 88     MARPOL 73/78 
STCW 78                 COLREG 72  
ILO Convention No. 147    TONNAGE 69
LL 66              SOLAS 74  
SOLAS PROT 78    MARPOL 73/78 
STCW 78           COLREG 72  
TONNAGE 69
LL 66 and LL PROT 88      SOLAS 74  
SOLAS PROT 78 and 88     MARPOL 73/78 
STCW 78                  COLREG 72  
ILO Convention No. 147     TONNAGE 69
Information Centre 
location 
DSI - Centre Administratif des Affaires 
Maritimes (CAAM), Saint-Malo, France 
Centro de Información del Acuerdo 
Latinoamericano(CIALA), Prefectura 
Naval Argentina, Buenos Aires
Asia-Pacific Computerized Information 
System (APCIS), Vladivostok, Russia 
Committee 
composition 
A representative of each of the authorities 
and the EC Commission 
A representative of each of the authorities A representative of each of the authorities 
Secretariat The Hague, The Netherlands Buenos Aires, Argentina Tokyo, Japan 
Signed on 1 July 1982 5 November 1992 1 December 1993 
Official languages English, French Spanish, Portuguese English 
Concentrated 
inspection 
campaigns 
Dedicated   to   operational   compliance 
on board passenger ships. 1 May to 31 July 
2003 covering most of the cruise season in 
Europe and Canada. 
August    -    October    2002 
-    Training Convention on STCW. 
February - April 2003 - ISM. 
July - September 2002 - ISM Code compliance. 
September - November 2003 - Bulk carrier 
safety campaign (same questionnaire as Paris 
MoU). Control of operational requirements 
campaign in Autumn 2004. GMDSS 2005. 
Major training/ 
exchange issues 
1st expert and specialized training - Human 
Element and Safety and Environment: 
Inspection of Tankers. 2nd expert training - 
Safety and Environment: IMDG Code, Load 
Lines, GDMSS and Oily water separators. 3rd 
expert training - Human element: ILO and 
STCW conventions, Intercultural 
Communication and Operational Control. 
 2nd regional training course  on  PSC  with 
the 13th Tokyo MoU basic training course (11 - 28 
Nov 2003) 10th seminar for PSC officers (22-24 
October 2003). Further fellowship training 
course   (19   Sept.— 7 Oct. 2003). Two expert 
mission training courses during 2003. Exchange 
programme for PSC officers. 
Total number of 
inspections/ detention 
rates +/- 
2002 - 1,577 detentions 2003 - 1,428 (9.45% 
decrease in detentions) inspection rate in 2003 
- 30.1% 
2002 - 151 detentions 3.3%  detention 
rate) 2003 - 126  detentions  (2.8% 
detention rate) 
2001 - 1349 detentions (detention rate 7.76%) 
2002 - 1307 detentions (detention rate 6.67%) 
2003 -1709 detentions (detention rate 8.49%) 
(31% increase in detentions) 
Chairman 
Secretary-General 
Mr. A. Cubbin (United Kingdom)  
Mr. R. Schiferli (Netherlands) 
Mr. E.S. Arce (Chile)  
Mr. J.J. Beltritti (Argentina) 
Mr. J. Mansell (New Zealand) (Former 
Chairman) Mr. K.-T. Lim (Republic of Korea) 
(Chairman elected in 2004) Mr. Y. Sasamura 
(Japan) 
New Members/ 
Observers 
Slovenia joined as full member 22 July 2003.  Observers: Macao, China and Viña del Mar 
Agreement and Black Sea MoU.
PSCC meeting 36th meeting in Dubrovnik, Croatia 12-15 
May 2003. 37th meeting in Copenhagen, 
Denmark 11-14 May 2004. 38th meeting 
in Helsinki, Finland 9-13 May 2005. 
10th meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina 
1-3 September 2003. 11th meeting in Viña 
del Mar, Chile 22-24 September 2004. 
12th meeting in Lima, Peru September 
2005. 
12th meeting in Renaca, Chile 24-27 March 2003. 
13th meeting in Port Vila, Vanuatu 23-26 February 
2004. 14th meeting in Shanghai, China 22-25 
November 2004. 15th meeting in Thailand 
November 2005. 
Inter-regional exchange 
of data 
Data provider to Equasis  Data provider to Equasis Inter-regional exchange 
Black Sea - Tokyo MoUs 
Website Email www.parismou.org    
office@parismou.org 
www.acuerdolatino.into.ar 
ciala@prefecturanaval. gov. ar 
www.tokyo-mou.org  
secretariat@tokyo-mou.org 
IMO workshop special 
responsibilities  
Chairman 2nd workshop - Prefecto 
Mayor P. C. Escobar (Argentina)  
 
* Pending  acceptance 
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 Caribbean MoU Mediterranean MoU Indian Ocean MoU 
Participating 
Maritime 
Authorities and 
Associate 
Members 
23 
 Anguilla*, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda*, British 
Virgin Islds*, Cayman Islds, Cuba, 
Dominica*, Dominican Republic*, 
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti*, Jamaica, 
Montserrat*, Netherlands Antilles, Saint 
Kitts & Nevis*, Saint Lucia*, Saint 
Vincent & the Grenadines*, Suriname, 
Trinidad & Tobago, Turks and Caicos 
Islds* 
11 
 Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan; 
Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Turkey and the Palestinian Authority* 
18  
Australia, Bangladesh*, Djibouti*, Eritrea, India, 
Iran, Kenya, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique*, 
Myanmar*, Oman, Seychelles*, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Yemen 
Observers IMO, ILO, CARICOM, IACS, Canada, 
USCG, Paris MoU, Viña del Mar, Tokyo 
MoU, DNV, Equasis and LR-F 
IMO, ILO, EC Ethiopia, IMO, ILO, PMAESA, 
Target  inspection 
rate 
15 % annual inspection rate per country 
within 3 years 
15 % annual inspection rate per country 
within 3 years 
10 % annual inspection rate per country within 3 
years 
Relevant 
instruments 
LL 66                   SOLAS 74  
SOLAS PROT 78        MARPOL 73/78 
STCW 78                COLREG 72  
ILO Convention No. 147   TONNAGE 69   
LL 66                SOLAS 74  
SOLAS PROT 78      MARPOL 73/78  
STCW 78             COLREG 72  
ILO Convention No. 147
LL 66                       SOLAS 74  
SOLAS PROT 78            MARPOL 73/78 
STCW 78                    COLREG 72  
ILO Convention No. 147      TONNAGE 69
Information 
Centre location 
Information Centre Suriname Information Centre Casablanca, Morocco Indian Ocean MoU Computerised Information 
system (IOCIS), Information Centre Goa, India 
Committee 
composition 
A representative of each of the authorities A representative of each of the authorities A representative of each of the authorities 
Secretariat 
location 
Kingston, Jamaica Alexandria, Egypt Goa, India 
Signed on 9 February 1996 11 July 1997 5 June 1998 
Official languages English Arabic, English and French English 
Concentrated 
inspection 
campaigns
  LSA campaign 2004. Fire-Fighting Appliances 1 
April-30 June 2005. 
Major      
training/ exchange 
i
  Seminar for PSCOs in India 
8-10 February 2005. 
Total   number 
of inspections/ 
detention rates +/- 
  2001 - 291 detentions (detention rate 5.27%) 
2002 - 306 detentions (detention rate 5.61%) 
2003 - 472 detentions (detention rate 9.27%) 
Chairman 
Secretary-General 
Mr. I English (Guyana) 
Mr. L. Bennett (Jamaica) 
Mr. L. Vassallo (Malta) 
Adm. H. Hosni (Egypt) (Former) 
Mr. F.S.A.H. El Kady (New 2005) 
Mr. M. Kinley (Australia) 
Mr. B. Ganguli (India) 
New Members/ 
Observers 
Tokyo MoU Black Sea MoU Observer Yemen new member ( as of 7th   meeting). 
Black Sea MoU and Equasis observers 
PSCC meeting 8th   Paramaribo, Suriname 
(28-30 October 2003). 9th meeting 
in Havana, Cuba (7 to 9 
September 2004). 10th meeting in 
Cayman Islands (June 2005). 
6th   meeting in Aqaba, Jordan (7-10 October 
2003). 7th meeting in Alexandria, Egypt (31 
January - 2 February 2005). Planned joint 
PSCC meeting in 2006 with Black Sea MoU 
in Istanbul, Turkey. 
6th   meeting in Goa, India (20 - 23 October 2003). 
7th meeting in Amboseli, Kenya (27 - 30 September 
2004). 8th   meeting   in   the 
Maldives/South   Africa (5 September 2005). 
Inter-regional 
exchange of data  
Unilateral consultation of Equasis  
Website 
Email 
Caribmou@Caribbeanmou.org www.medmou.org 
medmou@dataxprs.com.eg 
www.iomou.org 
iomou@sancharnet.in 
IMO      
workshop special 
responsibilities 
 Chairman 3rd workshop 
-Admiral H. Hosni (Egypt) 
Chairman 1* workshop - Capt. W.A. Dernier 
(South Africa) 
 
*Pending  acceptance 
Appendices 
  68  
 West and Central African MoU Black Sea MoU The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) Riyadh MoU 
Participating 
Maritime Authorities 
and Associate 
Members 
16  
Benin*, Cape Verde*, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire*, 
Gabon*, The Gambia*, Ghana, Guinea, 
Liberia*, Mauritania*, Namibia*, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa* and 
Togo* 
6 
 Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Turkey and Ukraine 
6 
The Kingdom of Bahrain, State of Kuwait, 
Sultanate of Oman, State of Qatar, Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, The United Arab Emirates 
Observers IMO, ILO, MOWCA IMO, ILO IMO, ILO 
Target    inspection 
rate 
15 % annual inspection rate per country 
within 3 years 
15 % annual inspection rate per country 
within 3 years
10 % annual inspection rate per country within 3 
years.
Relevant instruments LL 66                   SOLAS 74 
SOLAS PROT 78         MARPOL 73/78 
STCW 78                COLREG 72 
ILO Convention No. 147   TONNAGE 69 
 
LL 66               SOLAS 74  
MARPOL 73/78      STCW 78  
COLREG 72          TONNAGE 69  
ILO Convention No. 147 
LL 66                     SOLAS 74  
SOLAS PROT 78           MARPOL 73/78  
STCW 78                  COLREG 72  
TONNAGE 69  
ILO Convention No 174 (Minimum Standards, 
1976) 
Information Centre 
location 
MOWCA Headquarters, Abidjan, Côte 
d'Ivoire. Temporarily moved to Nigeria Abuja 
MoU Information Centre (AMIS) 
Black Sea Information System  (BSIS), 
Novorossiysk, Russian Federation Muscat, Sultanate of Oman 
Committee 
composition A representative of each of the authorities A representative of each of the authorities A representative of each of the authorities 
Secretariat location Lagos, Nigeria Istanbul, Turkey Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 
Signed on 22 October 1999 7 April 2000 30 June 2004 
Official languages English, French English Arabic (The official text of the Memorandum is the 
English version) 
Concentrated 
inspection campaigns    
Major training/ 
exchange issues 
National Information Centres established 
and National Database Managers (NDBMs) 
designated. NDBMs and PSCOs trained. 
Regional PSCO exchange programme 
initiated. PSCO Training Strategy (includes 
basic training, PSCO workshops and 
seminars, specialized training courses and 
PSCOs exchange programme.) Interregional 
exchange of PSC data with Tokyo MoU. 
IMO TC activity for IT development of 
information centre (2004) 
Total   number 
of inspections/ 
detention rates +/- 
2003 - 2 detentions (detention rate 1.9%) 2002   -   222   detentions   (detention 
rate 6.28% in 2002) 2003   -   249 
detentions   (detention   rate 4.76%) 
 
Chairman 
Secretary-General 
Mr. A. Mbaye (Senegal) Engr. B. Oluwole 
(Nigeria) 
Capt.      M.      Chintoan-Uta 
(Romania) (Former) Dr. V. Kliuev (Russian 
Federation) (New 2004) Mr. H. Yüce (Turkey)
 
New Members/ 
Observers    
PSCC meeting 3
rd meeting in Brazzaville, Congo 22 - 24 
October 2004. 4th meeting in Abuja, Nigeria in 
June 2005. 
4th meeting in Odessa, Ukraine (22 -26 April 
2003) 5th meeting in Novorossiysk, 
Russian Federation (26-30 April 2004) 6th
meeting in Batumi, Georgia (18-22 April 
2005) Planned joint PSCC meeting in 2006 
with MED MoU in Istanbul, Turkey. 
 
Inter-regional 
exchange of data  
Inter-regional    exchange    Black 
Sea   -Tokyo MoUs  
Website Email wcamoupsc@micro.com.ng 
abujamou@yahoo.com 
www.bsmou.org secretariat@bsmou.org 
bsmousecretariat@superonline.com  
IMO workshop 
special responsibilities  
Co-ordinator    of    Contact    Group 
on Information  Exchange  - Dr.   V. 
Kliuev (Russian Federation) (3rd workshop) 
 
* Pending acceptance
Source: (IMO, 2004) 
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Appendix C: Quality Shipping for the 21st Century 
United States Coast Guard Port State Control Quality Shipping Initiative 
The U.S. Coast Guard is pleased to submit a summary of Qualship 21, a new 
initiative to identify quality, foreign-flagged vessels, and provide them with 
incentives. 
Qualship 21, Quality Shipping for the 21st Century 
The number of substandard vessels in the United States waters has decreased, and a 
very small percentage of port State control exams result in a detention. While our 
targeting matrix appears to be effective in identifying the highest risk vessels for 
boarding and examination, Coast Guard policy requires all foreign-flagged vessels to 
be examined no less than once each year, regardless of the score that the vessel 
receives in the matrix. This provides few incentives for the well run, quality ship, and 
the United States believes that quality vessels should be recognized and rewarded for 
their commitment to safety and quality. Therefore, on 1 January 2001, the United 
States will implement an initiative to identify high-quality ships, and provide 
incentives to encourage quality operations. This initiative is called, Qualship 21, 
quality shipping for the 21
st 
century.  
By closely examining port State control data from the previous 3 years, the 
characteristics of a typical quality vessel were identified. A quality vessel is 
associated with a well run company, is classed by an organization with a quality 
track record, is registered with a flag State with a superior port State control record, 
and has an outstanding port State control history in the United States waters. Using 
these general criteria, approximately 10% of the non-U.S. flagged vessels that call in 
the United States will qualify for this initiative. The specific eligibility criteria are as 
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follows:  
1) The vessel may not have been detained, and determined to be substandard 
in the U.S. within the previous 3 years;  
2) The vessel may not have any marine violations (and no more than 1 Notice 
of Violation, also known as a ticket) in U.S. waters within the previous 3 
years;  
3) The vessel may not have had any major marine casualties or serious 
marine incidents in U.S. waters within the previous 3 years; 
4) The vessel must have completed a successful U.S. Port State Control 
examination within the previous 1 year;  
5) The vessel may not be owned or operated by any company that has been 
associated with a substandard vessel detention in the U.S. within 2 years;  
6) The vessel may not be classed by, nor have its statutory Convention 
Certificates issued by, a targeted class society. A class society is targeted 
if points are assigned in the Coast Guard’s port State control targeting 
matrix;  
7) The vessel must be registered with a flag State that has a detention ratio 
not more than 1/3 of the overall U.S. detention ratio (determined on a 
3year rolling average), and the flag State must have at least 10 U.S. 
distinct vessel arrivals in each of the last 3 years;  
8) The vessel’s flag State must submit its Self-Assessment of Flag State 
Performance to the IMO, and provide a copy to the Coast Guard; and  
9) Though not specifically mentioned in the above criteria, the Coast Guard 
reserves the right to restrict eligibility in the Qualship 21 initiative to any 
vessel because of special circumstances including, but not limited to, 
significant overseas casualties or detentions, and pending criminal or civil 
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investigations  
To encourage quality vessel operations, all Qualship 21 vessels will receive a 
Qualship 21 Certificate, and the vessel’s name will be posted on the Qualship 21 
page of the Coast Guard’s port State control internet web site. Qualship 21 vessels 
will also receive the following incentives:  
1) Freight ships will be eligible for a maximum of 2 years of limited port 
State control oversight. Annual exams of these vessels will be eliminated 
and replaced with biennial exams;  
2) Tank ships must still be examined annually, but the mid-period 
examination of a Qualship 21 tank vessel may be reduced in scope; and  
3) Passenger vessels will not be eligible for a reduction in port State control 
exams. While passenger vessels have an excellent safety record in the 
United States, there is too much at risk to consider any changes to our 
passenger vessel examination policy.  
A vessel owner will not be required to apply for Qualship 21 designation. The Coast 
Guard will screen its vessel database, and develop a list of ships that appears to meet 
the Qualship 21 qualification criteria. Letters will be sent to the vessel owners to 
notify them of the initiative, and their opportunity to participate. To qualify for the 
original list, owners would be required to answer a series of questions to verify that 
our initial screening of the vessel was correct.  
The Qualship 21 vessel list will be published annually (with the first list published on 
1 March 2001) on the Qualship 21 page of the headquarters port State control web 
site. Amendments will be made in the 2nd quarter of each calendar year, to add the 
vessels that were missed through the initial screening process. Input for the 2nd 
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quarter amendment will come from vessel owners who believe they have vessels 
eligible for designation, yet their vessels were not published on the list. Additionally, 
the annual vessel list will be updated monthly when eligible vessels complete 
required PSC exams, and when subtractions to the list are made as vessels trigger 
exit criteria.  
To maintain the integrity of the program, and to protect the safety of U.S. ports, a 
Qualship 21 vessel will be removed from the program when it triggers the following 
exit criteria: substandard detention in U.S. waters; marine violation, or more than 1 
ticket; serious marine incident or major marine casualty; discovered in  
U.S. waters with serious deficiencies, or failed to report a hazardous condition to the 
Captain of the port; transfers class to a targeted class society; or changes registry to a 
flag State that has a detention ratio more than 1/3 of the overall port State control 
detention ratio, or to a flag State that has less than 10 distinct vessel arrivals ineach 
of the previous 3 years. 
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Appendix D: The items that can be included in one PSC inspection 
 
CODES FOR NATURE 
OF DEFICIENCIES 
0100 SHIP'S CERTIFICATES AND DOCUMENTS 
0110 cargo ship safety equipment (including Exemption) 
0111 cargo ship safety construction (including Exemption) 
0112 passenger ship safety (including Exemption) 
0113 cargo ship safety radio (including Exemption) 
0114 cargo ship safety (including Exemption) 
0116 document of Compliance (DoC/ISM Code) 
0117 safety management certificate (SMC/ISM Code) 
0120 load lines 
0130 liquefied gases in bulk (CoF/GC Code) 
0131 liquefied gases in bulk (CoF/IGC Code) 
0135 minimum safe manning document 
0140 dangerous chemicals in bulk (CoF/BC Code) 
0141 dangerous chemicals in bulk (CoF/IBC Code) 
0150 prevention of pollution by oil (IOPP) 
0155 prevention of pollution by NLS in bulk (NLS) 
0157 
International Sewage 
Pollution Prevention 
Certificate 
0158 Statement of Compliance (CAS) 
0159 Interim Statement of Compliance (CAS) 
0160 International ship security certificate 
0171 Special Purpose Ship Safety 
0174 INF Certificate of Fitness 
0180 tonnage  
0190 logbooks / compulsory entries 
0199 other (certificates) 
0200 
CERTIFICATION AND 
WATCHKEEPING FOR 
SEAFARERS 
0221 certificates for master and officer 
0222 certificate for ratings for watchkeeping 
0223 certificates for radio personnel 
0224 certificate for personnel on tankers 
0226 certificate for personnel on fast rescue boats 
0227 certificate for advanced fire-fighting 
0228 Documentary evidence for personnel on passenger ships 
0229 
documentary evidence for 
personnel on ro-ro passenger 
ships 
0230 
manning specified by the 
minimum safe manning 
document  
0241 certificate for medical first aid 
0250 certificate for personnel on survival craft and rescue boats 
0251 Certificate for medical care 
0252 Evidence of basic training 
0253 Schedules for watchkeeping personnel 
0260 rest period 
0261 Records of rest 
0270 Endorsement by flag States 
0272 Application for endorsement 
0299 other (STCW) 
0300 
CREW AND 
ACCOMMODATION (ILO 
147) 
0301 minimum age 
0310 dirty, parasites 
0320 Ventilation 
0321 Heating 
0322 Noise 
0330 sanitary facilities 
0340 drainage 
0350 lighting 
0360 pipes, wires (insulation) 
0361 Electrical devices 
0370 sick bay 
0371 medical equipment 
0380 Access / Structure 
0382 Sleeping room 
0383 
No direct openings into 
sleeping rooms from cargo / 
machinery areas 
0384 Furnishings 
0385 Berth dimensions, etc. 
0386 Clear head 
0387 Messroom location 
0388 Oil skin locker 
0389 Laundry 
0390 Record of inspection 
0399 other (accomodation) 
0400 FOOD AND CATERING (ILO 147) 
0410 galley, handling rooms 
0411 Ventilation 
0412 Lighting 
0413 Cleanliness 
0420 Provisions (quantity) 
0421 Provisions (quality) 
0430 water, pipes and tanks 
0440 Cold rooms 
0441 Cold room temperature 
0442 Cold room cleanliness 
0450 Food personal hygiene 
0451 Food temperature 
0452 Food segregation 
0460 Record of inspection 
0499 other (food) 
0500 WORKING SPACES (ILO 147) 
0510 Ventilation 
0515 Heating 
0520 lighting 
0530 Safe means of access 
0531 Safe means of access Shore – Ship 
0532 Safe means of access Deck –Hold/Tank, etc. 
0533 Obstruction/slipping, etc. 
0540 Protection machinery 
0541 Electrical 
0542 Machinery 
0543 Steam pipes and pressure pipes 
0550 Danger areas 
0551 Gas instruments 
0552 Emergency cleaning devices 
0599 other (working spaces) 
0600 LIFESAVING APPLIANCES
0610 lifeboats 
0611 lifeboat inventory 
0613 stowage of lifeboats 
0615 rescue boats 
0616 rescue boat inventory 
0617 fast rescue boat 
0618 stowage of rescue boats 
0620 inflatable liferafts 
0625 rigid liferafts 
0628 stowage of liferafts 
0629 marine evacuation system 
0630 launching arrangements for survival craft 
0635 launching arrangements for rescue boats 
0636 helicopter landing/pick-up area 
0637 means of rescue 
0640 distress flares 
0650 lifebuoys 
0660 lifejackets 
0663 immersion suits 
0664 anti-exposure suits 
0666 thermal protective aids 
0669 Radio life-saving appliances 
0674 emergency equipment for 2-way communication 
0676 public address system 
0680 embarkation arrangements - survival craft 
0683 embarkation arrangements - rescue boats 
0684 means of recovery of lifesaving appliances 
0686 buoyant apparatus 
0690 line throwing appliance 
0692 operational readiness of lifesaving appliances 
0694 evaluation, testing and approval 
0695 on board training and instructions 
0696 maintenance and inspection 
0697 Decision support system for Masters on Passenger Ships 
0699 other (life-saving) 
0700 FIRE SAFETY MEASURES
0710 fire prevention 
0711 inert gas system 
0712 Division – main zones 
0713 Main vertical zone 
0714 Doors within main vertical zone 
0715 fire detection 
0716 Fire patrol 
0720 readily availability of fire fighting equipment 
0725 fixed fire extinguishing installation 
0730 fire fighting equipment and appliances 
0735 personal equipment 
0736 Emergency Escape Breathing Device  
0739 Emergency Fire Pump 
0740 fire pumps 
0741
Means of control (opening, 
closure of skylights, pumps, 
etc. machinery spaces) 
0743 Fire-dampers 
0745 Ventilation 
0746 jacketed piping system for high pressure fuel lines 
0750 international shore connection
0755 Fire control plan – all ships 
0760 Unattended Machinery spaces (UMS) evidence 
0770 Doc of Compliance Dangerous Goods 
0799 other (fire safety) 
0800 ACCIDENT PREVENTION (ILO 147) 
0810 personal equipment 
0815 Warning notices 
0820 protection machines/parts 
0830 pipes, wires (insulation) 
0850 Structural features (ship) 
0860 Entry dangerous spaces (instructions, warnings) 
0870 Cargo Gear Record Book 
0899 other (accident prevention) 
0900 
STABILITY, STRUCTURE 
AND RELATED 
EQUIPMENT 
0910 hydraulic and other closing devices/watertight doors 
0915 
signs, indicatiors (WT doors, 
fire detectors, fire dampers, 
ventilation) 
0920 Damage control plan 
0930 stability/strength/loading information and instruments 
0931 information on A/A-max ratio (ro-ro passenger ships) 
0936 steering gear 
0938 damage to hull due to weather or ship operation 
0940 ballast, fuel and other tanks 
0945 emergency lighting, batteries and switches 
0950 electric equipment in general
0951 low level lighting in corridors
0955 pilot ladders 
0956 gangway, accommodation ladder 
0960 means of escape 
0970 location of emergency installations 
0972 Permanent means of access 
0981 beams, frames, floors - operational damage 
0982 beams, frames, floors - corrosion 
0983 hull - corrosion 
0984 hull - cracking 
0985 bulkheads - corrosion 
0986 bulkheads - operational damage 
0987 bulkheads - cracking 
0988 decks - corrosion 
0989 decks - cracking 
0990 enhanced programme of inspection 
0991 survey report file 
0992 Thickness Measurement Report 
0999 other (stability/structure) 
1000 ALARM SIGNALS 
1010 general alarm 
1011 General emergency alarm 
1012 Crew alarm 
1020 fire alarm 
1030 steering-gear alarm 
1040 engineers' alarm 
1050 inert gas alarm 
1060 machinery controls alarm 
1070 UMS-alarms 
1080 boiler-alarm 
1090 Opening/closing watertight doors alarm 
1099 other (alarms) 
1100 CARRIAGE OF CARGO AND DANGEROUS GOODS
1110 stowage of cargo 
1115 cargo securing manual 
1120 grain 
1125 Authorization for grain carriage 
1130 stowage/packaging of dangerous goods 
1131 document of compliance on dangerous goods 
1132 booklet for bulk cargo loading/unloading/stowage 
1140 other cargo 
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1150 loading and unloading equipment 
1160 holds and tanks 
1170 dangerous goods codes 
1190 Lashing material 
1199 other (cargo) 
1200 LOAD LINES 
1210 overloading 
1220 freeboard marks 
1230 railing, cat walks 
1240 cargo and other hatchways 
1250 covers (hatchway-, portable-, tarpaulins, etc.) 
1260 windows, side scuttles 
1270 doors 
1275 ventilators, air pipes, casings 
1280 machinery space openings 
1282 manholes/flush scuttles 
1284 cargo ports and similar openings 
1286 scuppers, inlets and discharges 
1288 freeing ports 
1290 lashings (timber) 
1299 other (load lines) 
1300 
MOORING 
ARRANGEMENTS (ILO 
147) 
1310 ropes, wires 
1320 anchoring devices 
1330 winches and capstans 
1340 adequate lighting 
1399 other (mooring) 
1400 PROPULSION AND AUXILIARY MACHINERY 
1410 propulsion main engine 
1420 cleanliness of engine room 
1430 auxiliary engine 
1435 Gauges, thermometers, etc 
1440 bilge pumping arrangements 
1450 UMS-ship 
1460 guards/fencing around dangerous machinery parts 
1470 insulation wetted through (oil) 
1499 other (machinery) 
1500 SAFETY OF NAVIGATION 
1510 Type approval equipment 
1512 Operational limitations for passenger ships 
1514 
SAR coordination plan for 
passenger ships trading on 
fixed routes 
1530 radar 
1540 gyro compass 
1541 magnetic compass 
1542 
emergency steering position 
communications/compass 
reading 
1543 Compass correction log 
1544 Automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA) 
1546 direction finder 
1550 lights, shapes, sound-signals 
1551 signalling lamp 
1560 charts 
1561 Electronic charts (ECDIS) 
1565 Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
1566 Voyage data recorder (VDR) 
1567 GNSS receiver 
1570 nautical publications 
1575 echo-sounding device 
1580 speed and distance indicator 
1581 rudder angle indicator 
1582 revolution counter 
1583 variable pitch indicator 
1585 rate-of-turn indicator 
1590 international code of signals 
1591 Life-saving signals 
1592 Use of the automatic pilot 
1593 Record of testing and drill of steering gear 
1594 Voyage or passage plan 
1595 Navigation bridge visibility 
1596 Navigation records 
1597 Distress messages: obligations and procedures 
1599 other (navigation) 
1600 RADIOCOMMUNICATIONS
1611 functional requirements 
1620 main installation 
1621 MF radio installation 
1623 MF/HF radio installation 
1625 INMARSAT ship earth station
1635 maintenance/duplication of equipment 
1645 Performance standards for radio equipment 
1651 VHF radio installation 
1655 facilities for reception of marine safety information 
1671 satellite EPIRB 406MHz/1.6 GHz 
1673 VHF EPIRB 
1675 radar transponder 
1677 reserve source of energy 
1680 radio log (diary) 
1685 Operation/maintenance 
1686 Homing device 
1699 other (radio) 
1700 MARPOL - ANNEX I 
1705 shipboard oil pollution emergency plan (SOPEP) 
1710 oil record book 
1720 control of discharge of oil 
1721 retention of oil on board 
1725 segregation of oil and water ballast 
1730 oil filtering equipment 
1735 
pumping, piping and 
discharge arrangements of oil 
tankers 
1740 oil discharge monitoring and control system 
1745 15 PPM alarm arrangements 
1750 oil/water interface detector 
1760 standard discharge connection
1770 SBT, CBT, COW 
1771 COW operations and equipment manual 
1772 double hull construction 
1773 hydrostatically balanced loading 
1775 Condition Assessment Scheme
1780 pollution report 
1790 ship type designation 
1795 suspected discharge violation
1799 other (MARPOL/Annex I) 
1800 OIL, CHEMICAL TANKERS AND GAS CARRIERS 
1810 cargo area segregation 
1815 
air intakes/openings to 
accommodation-, machinery- 
and control station spaces 
1816 wheelhouse door, -window 
1820 cargo pumproom/handling spaces 
1825 spaces in cargo areas 
1830 cargo transfer 
1835 cargo vent system 
1836 temperature control 
1840 instrumentation 
1850 fire protection cargo deck area
1860 personal protection 
1870 special requirements 
1880 cargo information 
1885 tank entry 
1886 emergency towing arrangements 
1887 Safe access to tanker bows 
1899 other (oil tankers) 
1900 MARPOL - ANNEX II 
1910 cargo record book 
1911 p & a manual 
1920 efficient stripping 
1925 residue discharge systems 
1930 tank-washing equipment 
1940 prohibited discharge of NLS slops 
1960 cargo heating systems - cat. B substances 
1970 ventilation procedures/equipment 
1980 pollution report 
1990 ship type designation 
1992
Shipboard marine pollution 
emergency plan for noxious 
liquid substances 
1999 other (MARPOL/Annex II) 
2000
SOLAS RELATED 
OPERATIONAL 
DEFICIENCIES 
2010 muster list 
2015 communication 
2020 fire drills 
2025 abandon ship drills 
2030 damage control plan 
2035 fire control plan 
2040 bridge operation 
2041 operation of GMDSS equipment 
2042 HSC operation 
2043 Monitoring of voyage or passage plan 
2045 cargo operation 
2050 operation of machinery 
2055 manuals, instructions, etc. 
2056 establishment of working language on board 
2060 dangerous goods or harmful substances in packaged form 
2070 Operation of Fire Protection Systems 
2071 Maintenance of Fire Protection Systems 
2080 Operation of Life Saving Appliances 
2081 Maintenance of Life Saving Appliances 
2090 Evaluation of Crew Performance 
2099 other (SOLAS/operational) 
2100
MARPOL RELATED 
OPERATIONAL 
DEFICIENCIES 
2110 oil and oily mixtures from machinery spaces 
2115
loading, unloading and 
cleaning procedures for cargo 
spaces of tankers 
2120 garbage 
2130 Shipboard marine pollution emergency operation 
2199 other (MARPOL/operational)
2200 MARPOL - ANNEX III 
2210 packaging 
2220 marking and labeling 
2230 documentation 
2240 stowage 
2299 other (MARPOL/Annex III) 
2300 MARPOL - ANNEX V 
2310 placards 
2320 garbage management plan 
2330 garbage record book 
2399 other (MARPOL/Annex V) 
2500 ISM RELATED DEFICIENCIES 
2510 safety and enviromental policy 
2515 company responsibility and authority 
2520 designated person(s) 
2525 masters responsibility and authority 
2530 resources and personnel 
2535 development of plans for shipboard operations 
2540 emergency preparedness 
2545 
reports and analysis of 
non-conformities, accidents 
and hazardous occurrences 
2550 maintenance of the ship and equipment 
2555 documentation 
2560 company verification, review and evaluation 
2565 certification, verification and control 
2599 other (ISM) 
2600 
BULK CARRIERS - 
ADDITIONAL SAFETY 
MEASURES 
2610 bulkhead strength 
2620 endorsement of cargo booklet
2630 triangle mark 
2640 cargo density declaration 
2650 loading instrument 
2660 Water level indicator 
2699 other (bulk carriers) 
2700 
ADDITIONAL MEASURES 
TO ENHANCE MARITIME 
SECURITY 
2705 Ship security defects 
2715 Ship security alert system 
2720 Ship security plan 
2725 Ship security officer 
2730 Access control to ship 
2735 Security drills 
2799 Other (Maritime security) 
2800 
ADDITIONAL MEASURES 
TO ENHANCE MARITIME 
SAFETY 
2815 Marking of IMO number 
2820 Continuous synopsis record 
2899 Other (Additional maritime safety) 
2900 MARPOL ANNEX IV 
2910 Sewage treatment plan 
2920 Sewage comminuting system
2930 Sewage discharge connection
2999 Other (MARPOL-Annex IV)
9900 ALL OTHER DEFICIENCIES 
9901 
deficiencies clearly hazardous 
to safety, health or 
environment, specified in 
clear text 
9902 
deficiencies not clearly 
hazardous to safty, health or 
environment, specified in 
clear text 
 
 
Source: Port State Control Manual of Tokyo MOU 2004 
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Appendix E: The remedial actions in PSC inspection 
 
 
 
Codes for action taken 
 
   
 
Code 
 
 
 
Deficiency action code 
  
10 deficiency rectified 
15 rectify deficiency at next port 
16 rectify deficiency within 14 days 
17 rectify deficiency before departure 
18 rectify deficiency within 3 months 
30 detainable deficiency 
99 other (specify in clear text) 
  
PSC inspection action code (tick as applicable) 
  
40 next port informed ? 
45 rectify detainable deficiencies at next port ? 
50 flag State/consul informed ? 
55 flag State consulted ? 
70 recognized organization informed ? 
85 investigation of contravention of discharge provisions (MARPOL) ? 
 
 
Source: Port State Control Manual of Tokyo MOU 2004 
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Appendix F: Table 3 The status of the relevant instrument in Tokyo MoU 
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Source: Tokyo MoU 2004 Annual Report
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Appendix G: Table 4 Port State inspection statistics of Tokyo MoU in 2004 
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Australia 2,628 3,228 1,781 7,509 177 3,532 74.41 5.48 
Canada3) 374 388 243 1,012 29 1,514 24.70 7.47 
Chile 519 576 246 643 28 1,232 42.13 4.86 
China 3,017 3,897 3,073 16,040 194 7,956 37.92 4.98 
Fiji 7 7 2 5 0 135 5.19 0 
Hong Kong, China 697 745 643 3,244 169 3,742 18.63 22.68 
Indonesia 32 32 4 20 1 4,006 0.80 3.12 
Japan 3,260 4,896 3,735 22,781 459 6,862 47.51 9.38 
Republic of Korea 2,550 3,309 1,878 5,911 106 6,522 39.10 3.20 
Malaysia 340 353 131 630 5 3,652 9.31 1.42 
New Zealand 420 520 278 956 14 771 54.47 2.69 
Papua New Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 307 0 0 
Philippines 342 378 240 1,395 9 1,730 19.77 2.38 
Russian Federation3) 607 983 780 5,563 110 799 75.97 11.19 
Singapore 1,322 1,612 1,011 5,223 64 7,762 17.03 3.97 
Thailand 134 153 117 474 3 2,151 6.23 1.96 
Vanuatu 6 6 4 18 0 32 18.75 0 
Vietnam 290 317 230 1,739 25 1,153 25.15 7.89 
Total 10,922 21,400 14,396 73,163 1,393 Regional 
15,838 
Regional 
approx. 
69% 
Regional 
6.51% 
1) LMIU data for 2004. 
2) Method for calculation of inspection rate is changed from 2004. See also second paragraph in page 12. 
3) Data are only for the Pacific ports 
Source: Tokyo MoU 2004 Annual Report
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Appendix H: Table 5 The number of inspected ships per PSC officer in APEC 
economies 
Economies Ships inspected Number of PSC officers 
Ships inspected per 
PSC officer 
Australia 2,753 - - 
Canada 350 200 1.75 
Chile - 6 - 
China 1,510 450 3.36 
Hong Kong 900 13 69.23 
Indonesia 853 26 32.81 
Japan 3,579 - - 
Korea 1,846 10 184.60 
Malaysia 338 n.a. - 
Mexico - 20 - 
New Zealand 743 20 37.15 
Papua New Guinea 0 n.a. - 
Peru - 50 - 
Philippines 135 100 1.35 
Russia 428 57 7.51 
Singapore 1,019 - - 
Taipei - 200 - 
Thailand 83 6 13.83 
Source: KMI and KIMFT(2002), p.63. 
 
